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The "new" communications era is, by now, almost a clich6. One cannot
read the trade press without being bombarded with references to the "new
video marketplace" and the "explosion" in entertainment and information
systems. Beneath such catch phrases, however, lies a changing reality with
profound implications for federal regulation of both new and existing
technologies.
Perhaps the most significant development is the emergence of a more
diversified and flexible video marketplace in which a wide variety of video
services compete with television to deliver information and entertainment
to the home. In this market, commercial television faces competition from
cable television, subscription television (STV),I multipoint distribution
services (MDS),2 satellite master-antenna television (SMATV),3 home
videocassette and videodisc systems, and, in the near future, low power
television (LPTV)4 and direct broadcast satellites (DBS). 5 This abun-
dance, fueled by technological and regulatory developments, has, in turn,
driven regulatory change by eroding the historic rationale for broadcast
regulation, namely, the "inherent physical limitation" of the spectrum."
By blurring the traditional distinctions between the broadcast, common
1. See infra discussion at notes 7-21 and accompanying text.
2. See infra discussion at notes 82-100 and accompanying text.
3. See infra discussion at notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
4. See infra discussion at notes 154-59 and accompanying text.
5. See infra discussion at notes 60-75 and accompanying text.
6. See CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101 (1973).
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carrier and private radio services, technological developments have also
precipitated a regulatory identity crisis. While comparable video services
may be provided by MDS, cable, STV and conventional television, each
delivery system is subject to a different set of regulatory standards. Simi-
larly, a consistent regulatory approach has yet to be articulated for new
technologies such as videotex, which may use broadcast frequencies, cable
or telephone wire to deliver text and graphic information to television
screens or computer terminals. Judging by its recent actions in the DBS,
teletext and FM subcarrier proceedings, the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) appears to be moving toward a "functional" approach,
whereby the function of the service and the manner in which it is offered to
consumers, rather than the spectrum allocation, determines the regulatory
classification.
This article describes the wide array of technologies that comprise the
new video marketplace, and addresses the ways in which that diversity has
eroded traditional justifications for media regulation. It notes the efforts of
policymakers to replace the traditional "public trustee" model of regula-
tion with a marketplace approach, and to develop a cohesive regulatory
philosophy that both encourages technological development and responds
to the rapidly changing characteristics of the communications industry.
The article concludes with a discussion of the directions that "marketplace
unregulation" is likely to take over the rest of the decade.
I. INNOVATIONS IN VIDEO SERVICES
A. New Over-the-Air Video Services to the Home
L Subscription Television (STP)
Subscription or over-the-air pay television is not, technically, a new en-
trant in the video marketplace. The technology dates back to 1950, when
the first STV test was conducted in New York.7 STV is simply pay televi-
sion transmitted over the air by local television stations that have chosen to
offer subscription, rather than conventional advertiser-supported program-
ming. To limit reception to subscribers, STV stations, most of them on the
UHF band,' broadcast a scrambled signal which must be "decoded" by a
device attached to the subscriber's television set. Because subscription tel-
evision operates over-the-air on a specific allocated frequency, STV sta-
7. 1983 Field Guide to the Electronic Media, CHANNELS, Nov./Dec. 1982, at 34 [herein-
after cited as 1983 Field Guide]; FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, SUBSCRIvrION
TELEVISION, REPORT ON PROSPECTS FOR ADDITIONAL NETWORKS (prelim. report 1980).





tions have only one channel to program.9 The program fare is typically
movies, entertainment specials and sporting events.
Although nonexperimental STV stations were permitted by 1961,10 none
commenced operation until almost a decade later."' During the past three
9. While decoders are generally not capable of translating signals from different opera-
tors, technological developments may make system compatibility a reality. A new decoder
capable of bringing in more than one channel may soon be tested by three Dallas STV
stations. See id
10. See Connecticut Comm. Against Pay TV v. FCC, 301 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir. 1962)
(affirming FCC authorization of first STV station).
11. See Subscription TV Serv., 90 F.C.C.2d 341, 342 (1982). See also Subscription Tel-
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years, STV operations have more than tripled as a result of increased pub-
lic interest, developments in pay television technology, and relaxation of
regulations.' 2 As of May 1982, twenty-seven stations were on the air in
eighteen different markets, serving over 1.3 million subscribers.' 3 This
represents an increase of more than 50% in one year.
In a 1982 rulemaking proceeding, the Commission eliminated additional
restrictions on STV activity. 4 Its action is expected to stimulate further
growth of this video technology. In particular, the FCC deleted the so-
called "complement-of-four" rule which restricted STV operation to those
markets with at least four commercial television stations on the air.'5 This
regulatory change made eligible for STV vacant UHF and VHF alloca-
tions in 74 markets, encompassing more than 70% of television
households.6
Increasing judicial protection against unauthorized distribution of de-
coding devices is another factor encouraging the growth of STV.' 7 The
United States Courts of Appeals for the Sixth'" and Ninth 9 Circuits have
both held that STV transmissions are protected by section 605 of the Com-
munications Act, which prohibits disclosure of the "existence, contents,
substance, purport, effect, or meaning" of radio communications.2 0 Those
cases establish an implied right of action against unauthorized distributors
of decoders on behalf of STV licensees. In addition, improvements have
been made in securing STV systems against signal theft, especially in the
area of "addressable" systems which use a central computer to "address"
or activate individual decoders.2 '
2. Teletext
Teletext is a generic term for systems which transmit textual and graphic
evision, 15 F.C.C.2d 466 (1968), af'd sub nom. National Ass'n of Theatre Owners v. FCC,
420 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970).
12. In 1979, for example, the FCC eliminated the one station to a community rule. Pay
TV Serv., 46 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 460 (1979).
13. See Subscription TV Serv., 90 F.C.C.2d at 344.
14. Id at 360.
15. Id at 346-51.
16. Id See Subscription Television Serv., 88 F.C.C.2d 213, 221 (1981). As of March
1981, there were 222 vacant UHF and 36 vacant VHF allocations. Id
17. Various legislative solutions have also been proposed. See, e.g., H.R. 4727, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (introduced by Reps. Waxman & Wirth).
18. Chartwell Communications Group v. Westbrook, 637 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1980).
19. National Subscription Television v. S & H TV, 644 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1981).
20. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1976). This section specifically exempts from its general prohibi-
tion "receiving, divulging, publishing or utilizing the contents of any radio communication
which is broadcast... for the use of the general public ... ." Id (emphasis added).
21. Subscription TV Serv., 90 F.C.C.2d at 355-56 & n.23 (1982).
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SYSTEM TELEVISION RECEIVER i
TELETEXT DECODER
information on a one-way basis to the home viewer. 2 Teletext may be
"narrowband," utilizing the vertical blanking interval (VBI) of the televi-
sion signal,23 or "broadband," using an entire television channel. Broad-
band service would be delivered primarily by cable and MDS, while
narrowband may be carried by cable, MDS, television stations (including
low power), DBS and the subcarriers of FM stations.24
22. See generally Neustadt, Skall & Hammer, The Regulation of Electronic Publishing,
33 FED. COMM. L.J. 331, 332-41 (1981); S. MAHONY, N. DEMARTINO & R. STENOEL, KEEP-
INO PACE WITH THE NEW TELEVISION 188-93 (1980). The definition of "teletext" proposed
by the FCC is "a data system associated with a television broadcast signal that is used for
the transmission of textual and graphic information intended for display on the screens of
suitably equipped receivers." Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (BC Docket No. 81-741), 46
Fed. Reg. 60,851, 60,856 (1981). This definition was expanded to include "data that is in-
tended to enhance the use of teletext information." Teletext Transmission, 53 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P & F) 1309 (1983).
23. The VBI is the black bar that appears on a television screen when the vertical hold
needs adjusting. There are twenty-one lines in the VBI of which one is used to signal the
end of a video frame and another is authorized to be used for a closed-captioned service for
the hearing-impaired. All narrowband teletext systems require a terminal, wired to the dis-
play tube or built in, with a key pad and a decoder. Information is transmitted in a continu-
ous cycle or loop. The user punches a page number into the terminal device, the terminal
"grabs" the page as it flashes by and displays it on the screen. See S. MAHONY, N. DEMAR-
rno & R. STENOEL, upra note 22, at 189-90.
24. An example of a teletext venture, which proposes to use FM subcarriers to transmit
19831
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Teletext offers substantial opportunities for diversifying television serv-
ice into new areas and for improving the efficiency of spectrum usage. It
has the potential to be used for a wide variety of services, including closed-
captioning for the deaf, weather reports, news, comparative shopping
prices, community bulletins, stock prices, movie listings, telephone directo-
ries, advertisements and airline schedules. It also offers interesting pos-
sibilities to enhance television viewing, such as permitting a viewer
watching a baseball game to see a page of statistics on the batter.25 Such
information can be transmitted as either an advertiser-supported service or
a subscription service.
In March 1983, the Commission amended its rules to permit teletext
transmissions by television stations. 6 Favoring an "open environment" for
teletext systems, the FCC declined to adopt technical standards for a sin-
gle, nationwide system with compatibility for all teletext operations. In-
stead, television licensees can choose any technical system for transmitting
data signals, subject to minimum standards designed to prevent interfer-
ence with the broadcast service of the originating station, signals of other
broadcast stations or those of nonbroadcast radio stations. 27 This means
that the three principal systems currently vying for acceptance-the British
Ceefax system, the French Antiope, and the Canadian Telidon--could all
be represented in a single television market with viewers required to invest
in multiple decoders to receive all services.
28
Consistent with its current marketplace approach, the Commission au-
thorized transmission of broadcast and nonbroadcast material, including
non-display data. Licensees can also choose to operate services on a lease,
digital information, is that of National Public Radio in conjunction with the National Infor-
mation Utilities Corp. See Shribman, Public Radio in Deal to Send Data Text, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 20, 1982, at D4, col. 5. The data could range from computer programs and video
games to news and shopping information, and would be "piggybacked" onto the network's
regular FM transmissions.
25. Pollack, Teletext is Readyfor Debut, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1983.
26. See Teletext Transmission, 53 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1309 (1983); Teletext Substitu-
tion OK'd, CABLEVIsION, Apr. 11, 1983, at 14. See also Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(BC Docket No. 81-741), 46 Fed. Reg. 60,851 (1981).
27. Transmission of teletext would initially be authorized on lines 14-18 and 20 of the
VBI, with a phased-in approach allowing similar use of lines 10-13 in the future. The FCC
voted to keep teletext off line 21--presently used for closed captioning for the hearing-im-
paired-for a period of 5 years. Teletext Transmission, 53 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) at 1328.
See also Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (BC Docket No. 81-741), 46 Fed. Reg. 60,851,
60,854 (1981).
28. The French and Canadian system developers have joined with CBS Inc. and AT&T
in an effort to create a compromise system called the "North American Broadcast Teletext
Standard." Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (BC Docket No. 81-741), 46 Fed. Reg. 60,851,
at 7 (1981). For a discussion of the various teletext systems, see S. MAHoNY, N. DEM~A-
TnNo & R. STENOEL, supra note 22, at 193-211.
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franchise or common carrier basis. In addition, the Commission declined
to require mandatory carriage of teletext transmissions by cable systems,
thus enabling cable operators to insert their own teletext services.
Although television stations were not permitted under prior rules to use
the VBI for teletext transmissions, a number of stations had obtained tem-
porary experimental authorizations. For example, the Commission au-
thorized a one-year experimental teletext service over the broadcast
facilities of Chicago Station WFLD-TV to test the economic and technical
viability of a British teletext system in a major United States metropolitan
area.29 The service provided written news, other information and a lim-
ited amount of advertising to approximately 100 subscribers equipped with
special receivers and decoders."
A similar teletext experiment was conducted by KSL-TV, Salt Lake
City, on lines 15 and 16 of the VBI. Its offerings included airline schedules,
stock quotations, news, recipes and restaurant listings. Educational sta-
tions experimenting with teletext include WETA, Washington, D.C.,
which was authorized to conduct a pilot field test, and KCET, Los Ange-
les, which tested the French Antiope System.3 WKRC-TV, Cincinnati,
using the British system, has been broadcasting Electra, a 100-page teletext
magazine, since July 1982 under an experimental authorization from the
FCC.32
The national television networks have also experimented with teletext.
CBS began teletext tests at KMOX-TV, St. Louis, in March 1979, and has
been granted authority to conduct a similar experiment broadcasting an
on-screen magazine called "Extravision" in Los Angeles over stations
KNXT-TV and KCET. The network recently announced plans to launch
Extravision through its affilliates as a national teletext service.33 The serv-
ice would offer 100 pages of text, including airline schedules, movie and
theater listings, weather and stock market reports, and would be supported
29. See Petition to Authorize Teletext Service, (RM-3876), Mar. 26, 1981 (filed by
United Kingdom Teletext Industry Group urging adoption of standards based on the British
system).
30. WFLD-TV also inaugurated "Night Owl," a full channel text service which does
not need a decoder and operates from the hours of midnight to 6 a.m. Neustadt, Skall &
Hammer, supra note 22, at 345.
31. Other PBS stations involved in text experiments are KDIN-TV, Des Moines, Iowa;
KFME, Fargo, N.D.; KMTF, Fresno, Cal.; WUFT, Gainesville, Fla.; KUON-TV, Lincoln,
Neb.; WEDU, Tampa, Fla.; WGBH-TV, Boston, Mass.; WHA-TV, Madison, Wis.; WILL-
TV, Urbana, III.; KPBS-TV, San Diego, Cal.; and WOUB-TV, Athens, Ohio. Testing the
Waters, CABLEVIsIoN, Apr. 18, 1983, at 117.
32. Taft and Zenith Become Teletext Partners, BROADCASTING, Jan. 10, 1983, at 36.
33. CBS Readies Extravisionfor April Launch, BROADCASTING, Jan. 31, 1983, at 32-33.
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by national and local advertising.34 NBC also plans to offer a 100-page
nationwide advertiser-supported magazine to its affiliates."
Other media giants are similarly interested in teletext. Group W re-
cently completed a six-month test at its San Francisco television station
KPIX. The experiment, called "Direct-Vision," featured three magazines
including a news portion, a classified advertising section, and a daily shop-
ping guide. Group W worked with Sparks Newspapers on the classified
sections to adapt newspaper ads to teletext.36 Satellite Network Delivery
Corp., together with the Tribune Co., has proposed the first satellite-deliv-
ered teletext system, Business Teletext Network.37 The network would be
distributed to more than 150 television stations, with access to 95% of the
households in the United States.
Cable television systems have also offered teletext services without the
need for FCC authorization. While most of these services have been of the
passive variety in which users watch the text pass by, Atlanta television
station WTBS, carried on many cable systems, plans to make a cable
teletext service available in late 1983 that allows users to select what they
want to see. The service is being offered by Keycom Electric Publishing, a
joint venture of Field Enterprises (publisher of The Chicago Sun-Times),
Honeywell, Inc., and Centel, a telephone company.3" In addition, Time,
Inc. is testing an experimental teletext system in San Diego and Orlando
which would be one of the first to require advertisers to pay for time.39
Time, Inc. is also planning to devote an entire channel to its teletext sys-
tem, allowing it to have 5,000 pages in its magazine instead of 100. Time's
system will have more computer capability than the others, allowing view-
ers to request more specific information. °
3. Low Power Television (LPTF)
On April 26, 1982, the FCC established the first new broadcast service in
twenty years. 41 The service, called low power television (LPTV), utilizes
vacant UHF and VHF channels, and operates at power levels significantly
below those of full-service television stations. Thousands of applications
were filed during the pendency of the rulemaking, indicating the interest
34. Id
35. Testing the Waters, CABLEVISION, Apr. 18, 1983, at 111; Pollack, supra note 25.
36. Teletext by the Bay, BROADCASTINO, Jan. 10, 1983, at 98.
37. Gupta, Distribution Services Grow as More Satellites Launched, ELECTRONIC
MEDIA, Dec. 16, 1982, at 16.
38. Pollack, supra note 25.
39. See Pace, Videotex.- Luring Advertisers, BUSINESS DAY, OCt. 14, 1982.
40. Pollack, supra note 25.
41. Low Power Television Serv., 51 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 476 (1982).
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in, and need for, the new service.4 2 The Commission was forced to bar
further applications in order to permit processing of the backlog.4 3 Fol-
lowing this action approximately 2,000 additional applications were filed
under exceptions to the freeze," increasing the total to 7,900 as of late
1982.
A sampling of the applications for low power television licenses reveals
a wide diversity of proposals for religious, public affairs, sports, news and
educational programming in addition to programming for blacks, hispan-
ics, other minority groups and women.45 The Citizen Television System,
backed by Ralph Nader, filed applications for a consumer-oriented net-
work." Neighborhood Television, affiliated with Sears & Roebuck, pro-
poses a system of low power stations featuring programming with country-
western and rural American themes.4 7 Community Television Network
proposes to broadcast children's programming by day and subscription tel-
evision at night." The United Auto Workers has also applied for a
number of stations."9
Like STV, low power television technology has been available since the
1950's. Low power transmitters, known as translators, were first author-
ized by the Commission in 1956 as a means of receiving and rebroad-
casting television signals into regions that otherwise would have been
bypassed.5" Licensees of television broadcast stations have also used
42. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (BC Docket No. 78-253), 45 Fed. Reg. 69,178
(1980).
43. Memorandum and Order, 46 Fed. Reg. 26,062 (1981).
44. Where Things Stand, BROADCASTING, Jan. 3, 1983, at 20, 22. By March 1983, the
Commission had received approximately 12,000 applications. See LPTV Interests Call/or
Fast Track Review of Applications, COMMUNICATIONS DAILY, Mar. 16, 1983, at 2. The
Commission exempted from the freeze applications for communities that receive fewer than
two full-service TV signals, and applications seeking to change frequency due to land-mo-
bile use. Upon adopting the April 1982 Report and Order, the Commission left the freeze in
place for all LPTV applications except those where (1) the proposed transmitter site is more
than 55.5 miles from any FCC-ranked market; or (2) a change of frequency is required due
to land-mobile use or interference with a full-service station. Low Power Television Serv.,
51 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) at 1275, 1277.
45. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS, NEW TECHNOLOGIES AFFECTING
RADIO & TELEVISION BROADCASTING 35 (1982) [hereinafter cited as NEW TECHNOLOGIES].
But see Warner & Landro, FCC Swamped with Applicationsfor New Low-Power TV Sta-
tions, Wall St. J., Oct. 30, 1981, at 33, col. 3.




50. Report and Order (Docket No. 11611), 13 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 1561 (1956). See also
Report and Order (Docket No. 12567), 17 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 1735 (1960) (increased maxi-
mum power output of UHF translator stations from 10 watts to 100 watts); Report and
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translators to reach unserved areas within their Grade B contours5 and, in
some instances, to carry their signal beyond the Grade B contour. Trans-
lator operators were forbidden, however, to originate their own
programming.
5 2
Under the new LPTV rules, stations can originate live programming
from a local studio, broadcast pre-recorded video tapes or movies, and
broadcast programs received from a distant source, such as a satellite.
5 3
The rules allow low power stations to carry advertising or charge subscrip-
tion fees.54 The stations would operate at power levels of only 10 to 1,000
watts, and be capable of covering, at most, a fifteen to twenty-mile area.55
While the actual cost of a low power television station varies widely, de-
pending on the proposed operation, a basic version may cost only $50,000
to build, compared with $1 million or more for a conventional television
station, thus enabling those with relatively little capital to become broad-
casters.5 6 Existing translators may commence program origination merely
by filing a notification with the Commission.57
As of January 1983, the FCC had awarded 178 construction permits and
150 licenses for low power television stations--the vast majority located in
Alaska.58 Implementation of computer processing, and a lottery procedure
for selecting applicants,59 could drastically increase the pace at which
licenses are granted.
4. Direct Broadcast Satellites (DBS)
In June 1982, the Commission authorized a Direct Broadcast Satellite
Order (Docket No. 12116), 20 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 1536 (1960) (authorized VHF television
translators).
51. See 47 C.F.R. § 74.732 (1982).
52. A limited exception was made for UHF translators to originate, for 30 seconds an
hour, slide announcements soliticiting or acknowledging local public financial support.
Slide and Voice Announcements, 54 F.C.C.2d 421 (1975). See also Television Broadcast
Translator Station Rules, 13 F.C.C.2d 305 (1968).
53. 47 C.F.R. § 74.731 (1982).
54. Id
55. 47 C.F.R. § 74.735 (1982); Warner & Landro, supra note 45.
56. Mayer, Low Power Television" New Rules Spur License Competition, Wash. Post,
Wash. Business Section, May 31, 1982, at 1, col. 4.
57. 47 C.F.R. § 74.732(e) (1982). See also Low Power Television Serv., 51 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P & F) at 512.
58. Interview with members of the FCC Low Power Television Branch (Jan. 1983). See
Harrison, LPTV: Service Coming of Age Despite Problems With lll-Defued Name, Program
Divergence, BROADCAST WEEK, Feb. 14, 1983, at 24.
59. On March 31, 1983, the Commission adopted rules implementing a lottery system to
select among competing low power television and translator applicants. Report and Order
(Gen. Docket No. 81-768), 53 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1401 (1983). See Second Notice of










(DBS) Service, a regulatory development that could make available as
many as forty additional channels of video programming nationwide.6 °
DBS is a radio-communication service in which signals from earth are re-
transmitted by high power, geostationary satellites for direct reception by
small, relatively inexpensive earth terminals. Direct broadcast satellites,
which were allocated spectrum in the twelve GHz band for downlinks, and
in the seventeen GHz band for uplinks, are capable of transmitting a sig-
60. Direct Broadcast Satellites, 90 F.C.C.2d 676 (1982), appealpending sub nom. Na-
tional Ass'n of Broadcasters v. FCC, Case No. 82-2233 (D.C. Cir.). See generally FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, OFFICE OF PLANS AND POLICY, POLICIES FOR REGULA-
TION OF DIRECT BROADCAST SATELLITES (Sept. 1980) [hereinafter cited as DBS REPORT].
DBS is distinguished from current domestic satellite operations which broadcast to known,
fixed locations and generally use the C-band (4-6 GHz).
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nal up to forty times more powerful than those of current communications
satellites. 61 As a result, they send a television beam which can be picked
up by a two-foot dish, typically mounted on the rooftops of subscribers.62
Since the antenna bandwidth is narrower than conventional ones, up to
four DBS satellites would be required to reach the entire country.63
After establishing interim rules for the DBS service, the FCC granted
conditional construction permits to eight applicants whose submissions
contained diverse proposals.' The Direct Broadcast Satellite Corporation
proposes to provide transmission capability for hire as a common carrier.65
RCA and Western Union plan to make DBS capacity available to others
for program distribution, but would retain one or two channels for their
own use and would maintain greater control over their clients than a com-
mon carrier. 66 Three of the systems (CBS, Graphic Scanning, and Satellite
Television Corporation, a subsidiary of Comsat)67 wili be supported in
whole, or in part, by audience subscription.6
When fully operational, each system will provide as many as three chan-
nels of programming to each of the nation's time zones.6 9 While most of
this programming will be conventional television and pay-cable fare, the
proposals include some technically innovative services, such as high defini-
tion television (HDTV), 70 teletext, stereophonic sound and dual-language
sound tracks. The benefits of DBS will include service to remote areas that
receive no over-the-air television, the availability of additional channels of
service throughout the country, and the development of more specialized
programming.71
The construction permits are contingent upon the outcome of the 1983
Region 2 Administrative Radio Conference which will determine the as-
signment of frequencies and orbital positions. The applicants thus risk the
61. See, e.g., 1983 Field Guide, supra note 7, at 30.
62. See, e.g., id
63. See, e.g., id
64. CBS, Inc., 52 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1112 (1982). Interim rules for the new service
were adopted in Direct Broadcast Satellites, 90 F.C.C.2d 676 (1982), appealpending sub. nom
National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. FCC, Case Nos. 82-1926, 82-2233 (D.C. Cir.). The Com-
mission has not yet adopted permanent policies for DBS.
65. CBS, Inc., 52 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1112, 1118 (1982).
66. Id at 1121, 1123.
67. Id at 1117, 1120-21.
68. Id
69. Id at 1117-24.
70. HDTV would provide much sharper detail and color fidelity than the current televi-
sion system. One proposed HDTV system consists of 1,125 lines and would require five
times the bandwidth of two normal 525-line pictures. See NEW TECHNOLOGIES, supra note
45, at 20-21.
71. Direct Broadcast Satellites, 90 F.C.C.2d at 680.
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possibility that insufficient spectrum or orbital positions may ultimately be
available to accommodate all the systems. The Commission believed, how-
ever, that authorization of interim DBS systems would permit earlier im-
plementation of the service due to the long lead times required for satellite
construction.72
In addition, the applicants face competition from "back door," or quasi-
DBS programming services, such as those proposed by United Satellite
Communications, Inc. (USCI), backed by Prudential Insurance Co., and
publisher Rupert Murdoch's Inter-American Satellite Television Network
(IAST), which could be operational by late 1983. The direct-to-home sat-
ellite TV service proposed by those companies would utilize Ku-band
satellites, rather than the high-power direct broadcast satellites operating
in the DBS band.7 3 Recent technological developments have made possi-
ble the. use of small home receiving dishes in connection with satellites
operating in this fixed satellite band.74 The service could also deliver pro-
gramming to multiple-family dwellings, hotels, cable TV systems, MDS,
LPTV stations and SMATV systems. Both USCI and IAST ultimately
plan to offer five channels of programming to the entire nation.75
5. Satellite Master Antenna Television (SMA TV)
With satellite-fed master antenna television (SMATV), an operator sim-
ply puts an earth station (satellite dish or antenna) on top of an apartment
building or complex of buildings in order to obtain satellite program-
uing.76 The programming is delivered from the earth station to individual
homes through coaxial cable. SMATV, also referred to as "mini-cable" or
72. Id at 683-84.
73. Landro, United Satellite Plans TV Service Directly to Homes, Wall St. J., Feb. 26,
1982, at 18, col. 4. See also LAST is the Latest Entry in the DBS Equation, BROADCASTING,
June 27, 1983, at 40-1; Russell, Murdoch Enters DBS Race, CABLEVISION, May 23, 1983, at
67-70.
74. The KU-band (11.7-12.2 GHz) does not require a large (12 foot) dish, so individuals
would be able to use smaller (3 to 5 feet diameter) and less expensive dishes. The service
would also be less susceptible to disturbance by microwave signals. Prudential Places a Bet
on DBS, BROADCASTING, Feb. 7, 1983, at 31-32.
75. Id; lAST is the Latest Entry in the DBS Equation, supra note 73, at 40.
76. See generally NATIONAL Ass'N OF BROADCASTERS, SMATV: STRATEGIC OPPOR-
TUNITIES IN PRIVATE CABLE (Nov. 1982).
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"private cable," 7 is economically practical today only in mass dwellings,
77. SMATV systems, however, are generally exempt from reporting and other require-
ments applicable to cable television systems if they are confined to subscribers "in one or
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where installation costs-about $80,000 for a 400-unit apartment build-
ing-can be absorbed by a large number of apartment units.7 8
Two developments have spurred the growth of SMATV. First, techno-
logical advancements led to a precipitous drop in the cost of earth station
receivers, making such facilities practical for a wider range of users and
purposes. 79 As a result, the FCC in 1979 deregulated receive-only domes-
tic earth stations, and dispensed with licensing requirements for these fa-
cilities.8" Second, since the launching of HBO in 1975, numerous program
networks have materialized which use satellite delivery. The availability
of "superstations," such as WTBS in Atlanta, as well as specialized news,
cultural, sports, and religious programming has stimulated consumer
demand.
Another development which could further spur growth of the service is
the Commission's recent, and unprecedented, grant of a microwave license
in the Cable Television Relay Service to an SMATV operator.8 The li-
cense will enable the operator to link a cluster of apartment buildings in
Dallas, Texas, in order to provide a 98-channel bi-directional cable televi-
sion type service to residents of the complex.
6. Multipoint Distribution Service (MDS)
In 1974, the FCC allocated two channels 2 to MDS for the purpose of
providing a common carrier microwave service for closed circuit television
or nonvideo transmissions.8 3 The MDS station transmits omni-direction-
more multiple unit dwellings under common ownership, control or management." 47
C.F.R. § 76.5(a) (1982).
78. The development of SMATV has troubled cable companies since it is faster and
cheaper to install in urban areas. See The Pack of Competitors Cable Must Keep at Bay,
BusiNEss WEEK, Nov. 1, 1982.
79. Reregulation of Receive-Only Domestic Earth Stations, 74 F.C.C.2d 205, 207
(1979).
80. Id An equally significant decision in promoting satellite delivery of programming
services was the FCC's 1972 "open skies" decision which opened the domestic communica-
tions satellite field to free competitive entry. Domestic Communications-Satellite Facilities,
35 F.C.C.2d 844 (1972), afd sub non, Network Project v. FCC, 511 F.2d 786 (D.C. Cir.
1975). The FCC recently authorized the construction and launch of 19 new communications
satellites, and, to accommodate them, adopted a plan to reduce the space between satellites
in geostationary orbit. See FCC Opens Up Another Slice of Sky, BROADCASTING, May 2,
1983, at 31.
81. Cable Dallas, Inc., 53 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 651 (1983). See also Leddy, Microwave
Permit OK'd, CABLEVIsION March 14, 1983, at 16.
82. Although two channels are available throughout the United States to MDS, only in
50 of the larger metropolitan areas are both channels six MHz wide, and, therefore, ade-
quate for transmission of standard television signals. Notice of Inquiry and Proposed
Rulemaking (Gen. Docket No. 80-113), 45 Fed. Reg. 29,350 (1980).
83. Multipoint Distribution Serv., 45 F.C.C.2d 616 (1974).
1983]
Catholic University Law Review
ally from a fixed location to multiple fixed receivers with directive anten-
nas. 4 Although the FCC originally contemplated that MDS would be
used to provide educational, business, and governmental services, en-
tertainment programming emerged as its predominant function.85
Since the MDS licensee is a common carrier, it cannot provide program-
ming itself, but leases transmission time to a pay TV entrepreneur, such as
Home Box Office or Showtime, who obtains the rights to distribute pro-
gramming in an area and solicits customers.8 6 As a common carrier, the
MDS operator sets rates pursuant to a tariff, and must offer services on a
first come-first served basis.87
MDS primarily serves high-rise, multi-unit structures such as apartment
buildings and hotels, because of the limited distribution range of the trans-
mitter (twenty-five miles), the need for line-of-sight transmission to recep-
tion antennas, and the cost of installing the special receiving antenna.88 It
is used increasingly, however, in private homes and to distribute entertain-
ment programming to cable television systems.89 Through MDS, subscrib-
ers are able to receive programming similar to that carried on pay cable
channels without the need for cable wiring. In urban areas particularly,
MDS can provide a faster and, in many cases, cheaper method of estab-
lishing broadband channels than can cable, which has franchising require-
ments and extended construction periods." MDS has an advantage over
distribution modes such as STV and LPTV, in that it can expand the range
of video programming without utilizing broadcast frequencies. 9
Several recent developments could potentially expand the uses of MDS.
In May 1983, the Commission adopted a proposal to increase the number
of channels available for MDS use by giving the service access to eight
channels in the 2500 to 2690 MHz band which were allocated to the In-
structional Television Fixed Service (ITFS).92 In a related proceeding, the
84. Id at 617.
85. Notice of Inquiry, Proposed Rulemaking and Order (Gen. Docket No. 80-112), 45
Fed. Reg. 29,323, 29,325 (May 2, 1980).
86. Id at 29,325-26.
87. See 47 C.F.R. § 21.903(b) (1982). FCC regulations governing MDS are found in 47
C.F.R. §§ 21.900-21.908 (1982).
88. Multipoint Distribution Serv., 45 F.C.C.2d at 617.
89. See NEw TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 45, at 6.
90. Id
91. Id
92. FCC News Release, Rep. No. 17521 (May 27, 1983). See also Notice of Inquiry,
Proposed Rulemaking and Order (Gen. Docket No. 80-112), 45 Fed. Reg. 29,323 (May 2,
1980). In so doing, the Commission essentially adopted the proposal of Microband Corpo-
ration of America, submitted in that proceeding, to expand the capacity of all MDS stations
from one channel to five. Proposal of Microband Corporation of America (Gen. Docket No.










Commission is considering new MDS technical standards, which could fa-
cilitate, among other things, closer spacing of stations using the same
frequency.
9 3
The reallocation of channels will enable two competitive MDS operators
93. Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rulemaking (Gen. Docket No. 80-113), 45 Fed.
Reg. 29,350 (May 2, 1980). In another proceeding, the Commission is exploring ways (i.e.,
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in each market to offer multichannel service, consistent with the operations
of religious and educational groups which currently use the affected ITFS
frequencies. By reallocating additional channels to MDS, the Commission
has opened the door for services such as the five-city multichannel over-
the-air pay video service proposed in August 1982 by Contemporary Com-
munications Corp.94 CCC had proposed to operate on idle ITFS channels
in New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, St. Louis and Los Angeles95 with
programming for the service, to be known as Multiple Channel System
(MCS), to be provided by CBS as part of a market research test to deter-
mine the initial intermixture of programming and pricing in each mar-
ket.96 While pay video programming services were to be the mainstay,
future services such as videotex, teletext, video games, electronic banking
and shopping, HDTV, local telephone access services, and high speed data
transmission were also contemplated. 97
The Commission's decision would also permit innovations such as the
"Urbanet" service proposed by Microband Corporation of America, the
largest provider of MDS in the country.98 "Urbanet" would be an over-
the-air "wireless cable" system, making available pay-TV programming
and other offerings. Two-way capability is also envisioned through tele-
phone-based return circuits. 99
Although the reassignment of ITFS frequencies had been opposed by
various educational and religious interests which operate ITFS stations,
lotteries, paper hearings) to hasten the MDS application process. Notice of Inquiry (CC
Docket No. 80-116), 45 Fed. Reg. 29,335 (May 2, 1980).
94. See Application of Contemporary Communications Corporation for Developmen-
tal Authorizations to Establish Multichannel Systems (MCS), FCC File No. BPEX-8208-02-
KH6 (Aug. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Application of CCC]. Contemporary Communica-
tions Corp. (CCC) is an MDS operator funded by a European American Bancorp subsidi-
ary. The proposal asked that four to eight unused channels, currently allocated to the ITFS,
be made available for a three-year MDS experiment. See also CBS Knocks on Pay- Video
Door, TELEVISION DIGEST, Aug. 9, 1982, at 4. The Commission dismissed the CCC applica-
tion in its Report and Order amending the MDS rules, presumably to place other applicants
on an equal footing. See FCC News Release, Rep. No. 17521 (May 27, 1983).
95. CBS Knocks on Pay- Video Door, TELEVISION DIGEST, Aug. 9, 1982, at 4. See Ap-
plication of CCC, supra note 94. Although CCC had proposed to utilize between four and
eight channels in those cities, the new rules limit each MDS operator to five such channels.
96. See Application of CCC, supra note 94.
97. Id Under the proposal, the operator would control several adjacent channels, al-
lowing more efficient use of the band, and permitting services, such as HDTV, that do not fit
into one of the existing 6 MHz channels. These improvements would be achieved by em-
ploying separate amplifiers for visual and aural signals, and by using adjacent channel trans-
missions from a single transmission point.
98. Proposal of Microband supra note 92. Another company, Channel View, received
permission from the FCC in December 1981, to test an eight-channel system in Salt Lake
City. See CBS Knocks on Pay- Video Door, TELEVISION DIGEST, Aug. 9, 1982, at 4.
99. See Proposal of Microband, supra note 92.
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the Commission noted that, nationwide, ITFS spectrum remained idle. 1"°
To accommodate both ITFS and MDS users, the Commission
grandfathered existing ITFS licensees and authorized such licensees to
share or lease their excess channel capacity with MDS operators.
7 Private Operational-Fixed Microwave Service (OFS)
In 1981, the Commission authorized use of business radio facilities in
the private operational-fixed microwave service (OFS) °'' for transmission
of video programming to hotels and other commercial facilities. 02 Prior
to that decision, OFS facilities were used to transmit information and in-
structions related to the main operations of noncommunications busi-
nesses.' 03 In adopting the rule changes, the Commission opened a
distribution path between the licensee and its customers for transmission
of the licensee's own products, including video programming." 4 The FCC
foresaw a variety of potential uses for private distribution systems includ-
ing video material distribution, voice, and, in the future, high speed data
services distribution.'0 5 In response to the Commission's action, and re-
flecting interest in the new service, approximately 1,400 applications were
filed by sixty different entities seeking to provide video entertainment serv-
ices to hotels and other locations.10 s
Upon reconsideration of its 1981 decision, in May 1983, the Commission
drastically expanded the potential uses of OFS facilities, and made that
service a viable means of delivering video entertainment to the home. In
particular, the Commission authorized the use of frequencies above 21.2
GHz for the delivery, by OFS licensees, of their own products or services
to any receiving location, including hotels, apartment house master an-
tenna systems, and private residences.' 07 After August 1, 1985, the Coin-
100. FCC News Release, Rep. No. 17521 (May 27, 1983).
101. Private operational-fixed microwave service (OFS) is identical to MDS from an en-
gineering standpoint. Private radio regulations, however, traditionally restricted the use of
business microwave facilities to transmission among different parts of the same company.
See Transmitting Program Material to Hotels, 39 F.C.C.2d at 532-33.
102. Use of Private Microwave Frequencies, 86 F.C.C.2d 299 (1981).
103. See Transmitting Program Materials to Hotels, 39 F.C.C.2d 527, 532 (1973).
104. Use of Private Microwave Frequencies, 86 F.C.C.2d at 309.
105. Omnidirectional and other point-to-multipoint operations were restricted to the
three 6 GHz channels in the 2.5 GHz band and point-to-point operations to the band above
13 GHz. See 47 C.F.R. § 94.61 (1982). See also 86 F.C.C.2d at 308.
106. Memorandum Opinion and Order in Docket No. 19671, FCC 83-245, released June
23, 1983 at 23.
107. Id at 30. While the 21 GHz band is subject to attentuation under certain atmos-
pheric conditions, the Commission obviously hopes to encourage technological change to
improve reception-an instance where regulatory developments may spur technological
innovations.
1983]
Catholic University Law Review
mission will also authorize private video entertainment systems in the 2.5
MHz band.'
The Commission has thus eliminated the home video programming re-
striction upon OFS use, putting that service on a comparable footing with
MDS as a video entertainment distribution system.1°9 It also appears that
the Commission has lifted the restriction upon uses of OFS frequencies to
transmit program material to broadcast stations, cable systems, MDS sys-
tems and SMATV systems, at least in the bands above 21,200 MHz. 10
Moreover, by allocating frequencies above 21.2 GHz for OFS, the Com-
mission indicated that many more entertainment systems could be accom-
modated than possible at 2.5 GHz, making multiple channel use a future
possibility. I I I
OFS licensees will still be required to have an ownership or contractual
interest in the information or services they distribute."l2 The service could
not, therefore, be used to sell transmission capability to others." 13
CABLE TV SYSTEM
CABL
108. Id at 29.
109. Id at 28.
110. Id at App. 2.
111. Id at 28.
112. See 47 CFR § 94.9(a)(1) (1982). See also Use of Private Microwave Frequencies, 86
F.C.C.2d at 304, 309.
113. See 47 CFR § 94.9(b)(1) (1982).
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B. New Closed Transmission Video Services to the Home
I Cable Television and Interactive Cable Television
Cable, as distinguished from over-the-air video services, relies upon a
wired network. The wire or coaxial cable is strung along utility poles or
through underground telephone ducts and is connected to the subscriber's
residence. Cable systems are experiencing an explosive growth rate, with
more than 35% of American television households presently subscribing to
cable television." 4 Industry analysts estimate that, by 1985, cable will
have penetrated 35% to 50% of United States television households." 5 By
1990, from forty-five to sixty-three million subscribers--one-half to two-
thirds of the total United States television households-are expected to
subscribe to cable." 6
Technological advances are primarily responsible for cable's growth.
While older cable systems typically provided twelve channels, the develop-
ment of converters in the 1960's increased the capacity of CATV systems
to twenty channels.' " Refinements in the converter have made possible
the provision of fifty-two channels on a single cable line. By using two
lines, cable systems can offer 104 channels of programming." 8 Other ad-
vances, such as General Electric's Comband technique whereby two video
program services can be transmitted over a single cable television channel
through the use of analog compression, promise to further expand cable's
already abundant channel capacity." 9 Recent proposals, for example, en-
vision 200 or more channels.' 20
This abundant channel capacity, in turn, has had an impact on software,
spawning new satellite interconnected cable networks, such as the En-
tertainment and Sports Programming Network (ESPN), Cable News Net-
work (CNN), and Nickelodeon (children's programming). 12 1 In addition,
the excess channel capacity of local cable television systems has been uti-
lized by third parties, such as newspapers and broadcasters, on a leased or
joint venture basis, to deliver program or information services to subscrib-
ers. By the end of 1981, sixty-nine newspapers had arranged to provide
114. See, e.g., Cable Contrast, BROADCASTING, Sept. 13, 1982, at 84.
115. See Broadcasting Lass, CABLEVISION, Nov. 29, 1982, at 25. See also Browne, Bortz
and Coddington, An Analysis of the Television Programming Market, 21-24 (Jan, 1983),
reprinted in Comments of American Broadcasting Cos. (BC Docket No. 82-345), filed Jan.
24, 1983 [hereinafter cited as BBC Study].
116. BBC Study, supra note 115, at 79-80.
117. 1983 Field Guide, supra note 7, at 9.
118. Id
119. See infra notes 168-70 and accompanying text.
120. See 1983 Field Guide, supra note 7, at 4-9.
121. See NEw TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 45, at 3, 32-35.
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video, audio, or text services on local cable systems. 22
More recently, two-way or interactive cable television systems have been
introduced. 12 3 Warner-Amex Cable pioneered interactive cable with its
"Qube" system in 1977, and other operators have since developed their
own versions."24 Interactive technology permits the cable system to poll its
viewers on such matters as the winner of the next college football game, a
presidential press conference, and political issues. Viewers have played
game shows, "gonged" local talent off the air, ordered library books, and
indicated their solutions to moral dilemmas dramatized by actors.' 25 Sub-
scribers also have been asked to offer their opinions on President Carter's
1979 energy speech and Ralph Nader's petition to change children's
advertising.
126
Two-way capacity will also simplify "pay-per-view" programming, that
now requires advance advertising and distribution of special decoders to
unscramble the signal. With interactive cable, the viewer registers a pref-
erence on the console, the computer supplies the signal, and the viewer is
automatically billed.
These technological developments have been accompanied by the relax-
ation of federal regulation during the past decade. The deregulatory trend
began with the Supreme Court's 1979 Midwest Video decision, 127 circum-
scribing the Commission's jurisdiction over cable television, and
culminated with the elimination, in 1981, of virtually all restrictions upon
the number of distant station signals that cable systems may import, and
removal of "syndicated exclusivity" rules that required cable systems to
"black out" some programs.' 2 The extent of cable regulation by local
franchising authorities may also be relaxed if S.66 (the Cable Telecommu-
nications Act of 1983), which was approved by the U.S. Senate, is enacted.
2. Cable Interconnect Systems
Recently, in an effort to attract advertising dollars, entrepreneurs have
122. See Price, The Magic Formula, CABLEVISION PLUS, Feb. 8, 1982, at 4; S. BROTMAN
& L. LEVINE, THE OPPORTUNITIES OF CHANNEL LEASING: STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS
FOR BROADCASTERS (National Assoc. of Broadcasters, June 1982).
123. Two-way cable uses two wires so that information can flow in both directions. The
wires are hooked up to a large central computer that tabulates viewer responses by checking
each home in the system every few seconds. Viewers can participate in programming by
punching buttons on a hand-held console. 1983 Field Guide, supra note 7, at 10.
124. Id See also Qube Anniversary, CABLEVISION, Dec. 13, 1982, at 27.
125. 1983 Field Guide, supra note 7, at 10.
126. Id
127. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
128. Malrite TV v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1981), at'g, CATV Syndicated Program
Exclusivity Rules, 79 F.C.C.2d 663 (1980).
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been experimenting with "interconnects," where a common entity repre-
sents a number of cable systems in the sale of advertising time.129 Inter-
connects effectively transform numerous, discrete cable systems into a
mini-network by tying together neighboring systems.
There are two basic types of interconnects. The hard or physical inter-
connects link a number of systems together by a microwave radio net-
work 130 or by coaxial cable. The soft or simulated interconnects do not
actually establish electrical connection among the participating systems.
Instead, they involve agreements allowing a common entity to sell adver-
tising time on participating cable systems as a single network.
Hard interconnect systems have made the greatest gains. The first hard
interconnect was the Bay Area Interconnect, linking 475,000 subscribers in
the San Francisco area. Gill Cable, the San Jose cable operator that con-
ceived the idea, receives satellite programming, inserts commercials sup-
plied by national and regional advertisers, and sends the mixture over a
microwave network to thirty-one other systems.' 3 ' Other hard cable inter-
connects, based upon the Bay Area model, include Harron Cable, which is
presently building a four-channel microwave network in the Philadelphia
market; 132 Cox Cable, which distributes KCOX, a programming service,
via a one-channel microwave to two other systems in San Diego
County; 33 and Heritage Communications, a one-channel network inter-
connecting twenty-one systems in Iowa.'
34
Soft interconnect systems, although not as numerous, also exist in differ-
ent regions of the country. Such interconnects include New England
Cable Rep, which represents twenty systems with 500,000 subscribers in an
area stretching from Maine to Connecticut, 3- and Eastman Cable Rep,
which operates on a national level.' 36 While the soft interconnect cannot
transmit commercials to appear on multiple systems simultaneously, it
129. See generally Cable Interconnects.- Making Big Ones Out of Little Ones, BROAD-
CASTING, Mar. 1, 1982, at 59.
130. Id
131. Id. at 60.
132. Id
133. Id
134. Id The Bay Area, Cox, Heritage and Harron intercepts are controlled by one com-
pany that induces systems to affiliate through various tactics such as offering a nickel per
subscriber and a share of operating profits, or by charging for supplying local programming.
In contrast, Centel Videopath Network, a two-way multiple channel microwave network
presently under construction in the Chicago area, would operate as a common carrier. To
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does permit advertisers to choose the markets they want to reach and re-
quires no capital investment.
3. Common Carrier Wireine or Fiber Optic Services
Fiber optics, a relatively recent technological development, promise to
revolutionize delivery of video signals to the home. Unlike conventional
wire, fiber optics utilize digital pulses of light sent through flexible strands
of glass. Since light waves are higher on the spectrum than radio waves, a
much greater amount of information can be transmitted through an optical
fiber than through a conventional wire.'37 Fiber optics are also much less
expensive to produce and are free from signal interference.
138
The trade press has reported a number of proposals involving fiber optic
cable. The telephone company in some places has begun replacing con-
ventional telephone lines with fiber optics;"' 9 coverage of the 1984
Olympic Games, for example, will be by means of fiber optic lines sup-
plied by Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. and GTE of California.
Fisher Communications recently announced plans to build the world's
largest fiber optic cable system, involving 120 miles of fiber optic plant for
United Cable Television's 120 channel system in Alameda, California."
MCI Communications Corp. plans to install fiber optic data and commu-
nications lines along railroad tracks in the Washington-New York corri-
dor. 4 1 The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey has proposed a
"Teleport" on Staten Island, with twelve to seventeen earth stations linked
by fiber optic cable to the World Trade Center, and other points in New
York and New Jersey." 2
4. Electronic Publishing Services
Electronic publishing is the generic term for a variety of systems that
disseminate text and graphic information for display on television screens
or terminals. When the textual information is transmitted one way, it is
called teletext."43 Interactive systems that utilize telephone or two-way
137. Fiber optics would permit the telephone company, for example, to compete with
cable by carrying hundreds of video signals into or out of the home through a single wire.
138. See 1983 Field Guide, supra note 7, at 61; Dawson, Changing the Speed of Light
CABLEVISION PLus, Feb. 28, 1983, at 32-44.
139. Rothbart, Fiberoptic Reality, CABLEVISION, Dec. 6, 1982, at 26.
140. Id
141. MCI to Lay Fiber Optic Cable Along CSX Tracks, COMMUNICATIONS DAILY, Dec.
27, 1982, at 2-3.
142. Rothbart, Manhattan Teleport, CABLEVIsION, Jan. 10, 1983, at 121.
143. See supra notes 22-40 and accompanying text. As noted, teletext may be transmit-
ted over the VBI of television stations, as part of a cable television signal or by other means.
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cable lines are called videotex.'" In addition to information retrieval,
videotex offers the possibility of conducting transactions, such as shopping
and banking from the home. Electronic mail is also a potential use. 4 '
Several videotex-type services are now available. "The Source" and
"CompuServe," make available national data bases to home computers via
telephone lines. ' The Source plans to offer over 2,000 programs, includ-
ing text editing, income tax preparation packages, games, airline ticketing
services, UPI News Wire Service, and electronic mail. CompuServe, oper-
ating in Columbus, Ohio, has enlisted eleven newspapers to experiment
with electronic news and classified advertising. Viewtron, an interactive
system operating in Coral Gables, Florida, transmits over telephone lines
information generated by Knight-Ridder newspapers. Subscribers can re-
trieve news, weather, sports, product ratings, and classified ads, as well as
order airline and theater tickets over the system.' 47
Another electronic publishing venture, Newsnet, will transmit over tele-












CENTRALTERMINAL STANDARD VIDEO CASSETTE
TV SET I
144. The terminology in this area is unsettled. See Neustadt, Skall & Hammer, supra
note 22, at 331.
145. See 1983 Field Guide, supra note 7, at 46.
146. Neustadt, Skall & Hammer, supra note 22, at 342.
147. Id at 342 n.34; Testing the Waters, CABLEVISION, Apr. 18, 1983, at 110.
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subscribers. 48 CBS and AT&T conducted a joint videotex experiment in-
volving 100 households in Ridgewood, New Jersey,149 that offered a broad
range of local and national consumer information and transaction services.
CBS was responsible for the information content and AT&T provided
computer facilities and home terminals.
The telephone network is currently the transmission vehicle for vide-
otex, since most cable systems lack two-way capacity. 50 There are some
exceptions, most notably, the two-way Shopping Channel,' 5' available in
markets served by the Times Mirror cable systems, and Warner-Amex's
Qube operations in Columbus, Cincinnati, Pittsburgh, and Dallas. Cox
Cable is testing a system in San Diego, called Indax, that uses two cable
channels--for upstream and downstream signals' 2-- to provide informa-
tion, electronic mail, and home banking and shopping to subscribers."'
C Recorded Video Servicesfor Home Use
1. Videocassette Recorders and Videodisc Players
Any discussion of the new video marketplace must include videocassette
recorders (VCRs) and videodisc players (VDPs), as another programming
and distribution development that has altered the traditional pattern of
television service. VCRs are not revolutionary from a technical stand-
point, having been developed in the early 1950s. Fundamentally the same
as audio recording devices, VCRs are capable of playing prerecorded tape
cassettes, and of recording and playing back material from television or
other video sources, including an attached video camera. 54 But technical
148. Klein, Now, the Electronic Newsletter, N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1982, at 8F, col. 1. The
newsletters carried by Newsnet-which pay nothing for the service-include Job Safety and
Health Report, Energy Daily, Sludge Newsletter, Washington Letter on Latin America, Sat-
ellite Week, the Newsletter Association of American Hotline and the Delta Report. New-
snet charges each subscriber for "connect time" to the material stored on computer.
The Newsnet concept is novel in that most other data base operators, such as Lockheed's
Dialog and Mead Data's Nexus, utilize large computer-based libraries of data that give sub-
scribers access to encyclopedic collections of demographic, industrial, econometric and other
specialized information. In contrast, Newsnet's emphasis will be on newsworthy informa-
tion. Unlike traditional wire services such as AP and UPI, however, the information will be
organized by subject, for easy retrieval by specialized subscribers.
149. A Hookup Between Giants, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 5, 1981; Pace, supra note 39; Testing the
Waters, CABLEVISION, Apr. 18, 1983, at 110.
150. See Neustadt, Skall & Hammer, supra note 22, at 369.
151. Cooney, With Video Shopping Services Goods You See on the Screen Can Be Deliv-
eredto Your Door, Wall St. J., July 14, 1981, at S2, col. 1.
152. Downstream signals are those that run from an outside programmer or service to
the home. Upstream signals run from the home to the outside source.
153. Neustadt, Skall & Hammer, supra note 22, at 343; Testing the Waters, CABLEVI-
SION, Apr. 18, 1983, at Ill.
154. Two incompatible VCR formats, Beta and VHS, presently coexist. Although the
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problems, cost and unwieldy size relegated VCRs to institutional use until
the introduction of Sony's Betamax recorder in 1975. 55 Since that time,
more than five million Americans have purchased VCRs for home use.'
56
Videocassettes have had a twofold impact on the video marketplace.
First, the "time variance" capability of VCRs permits viewers to tape tele-
vision or cable shows for viewing at more convenient times. Time shift
viewing liberates viewers from the programmer's rigid schedules, and, for
this reason, expands the audience for television and cable programming.157
Second, VCRs make available a wide range of specialized, nonbroadcast
programming. Users can purchase or lease video material for personal use
to supplement the video information that is otherwise available though
broadcast or cable service.
Videodisc players are a more recent development, utilizing phonograph-
type "records" rather than tape to store video information. 5 ' Videodisc
players also allow the release of video information to the home market, but
presently cannot record material from other sources.' 59 The advantage of
the VDP is its ability to provide stop action, slow motion and random
access to individually addressed frames, thus providing a capability to dis-
play text and still photographs. These capabilities suggest that the primary
use may be in an educational setting or for occupational training.
2 Video Game Cartridges and Systems
Video games are not directly competitive with broadcast and cable tele-
vision as are VCRs and VDPs which offer similar entertainment. They are
significant, however, in that they use the television screen as a display de-
vice, permitting viewers to control the images on their screen. Video
games are present in 25% of the nation's television homes, and it is ex-
pected that this percentage will double by 1985.11
two systems offer essentially the same features, the VHS system's longer recording time has
assured its market dominance.
155. See generally NETWORK INQUIRY SPECIAL STAFF, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION, HOME VIDEO: A REPORT ON THE STATUS, PROJECTED DEVELOPMENT AND
CONSUMER USE OF VIDEOCASSETTE RECORDERS AND VIDEODISC PLAYERS (Feb. 1980).
156. Id
157. See NEW TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 45, at 27; see also The Righteous Wrath of Jack
Valenti, BROADCASTING, Feb. 14, 1983, at 66-67.
158. See Network Inquiry Special Staff, supra note 155.
159. There are two incompatible videodisc systems with slightly different capabilities.
The phonograph-style player developed by RCA uses a stylus and grooved discs. Philips
and Pioneer have introduced a more expensive system which uses a low-power laser to
"read" the disc. See 1983 Field Guide, supra, note 7, at 49.
160. Mansfield, The Big Bang of Marketing Home Videogames, ADVERTISING AGE, Aug.
30, 1982, at M3; see Computer or Video Game, N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1983, at Dl; 1983 Field
Guide, supra note 7, at 54.
19831
Catholic University Law Review
Video games are also melding with other new technologies. Several
cable operators have signed with The Games Network, a company that
distributes games licensed from independent computer programmers for
display on a video channel.16' Play Cable, a joint venture between Mattel,
Inc. and General Instrument, offers subscribers of about fifteen cable sys-
tems twenty-four hour access to all Mattel Intellevision games.' 62 Teletext
services, provided by Time, Inc. over cable systems in San Diego, Cal. and
Clearwater, Fla., have included educational video games among their of-
ferings.'63 Other teletext experiments, including those conducted by the
Times Mirror in Mission Viejo, and Palos Verdes, Cal., indicate that
games are one of the service's most popular features.'
3. VCR Applications
Several interesting proposals combine VCR and broadcast technologies
to provide over-the-air taping. Music, movies, video games and other
forms of entertainment or information can be electronically transmitted to
homes and recorded by machines automatically activated to receive the
transmission. A new word, "telesoftware," has been coined to describe
such electronic distribution of programming. 65 Several entities are plan-
ning telesoftware applications. ABC, for example, plans to launch a ven-
ture, recently renamed "Telelst," that will broadcast pay programming in
scrambled form over its owned stations and affiliates during the early
morning hours.'" ECO, Inc., an electronics company in Santa Ana, Cal.,
161. A 100 home test, for example, was conducted at Group Ws Fullerton, Cal. system.
See CableScope CABLEVISION, Dec. 6, 1982, at 9; CABLEVISION PLus, Jan. 10, 1983, at 6.
162. Its signals are sent over vacant portions of the FM radio spectrum. Cros.firel,
CABLEVISION PLUS, Jan. 10, 1983, at 5-6.
163. See Pace, supra note 39.
164. See Testing the Waters, CABLEVISION Apr. 18, 1983, at 117.
165. See Pollack, Technology-Taping Shows Off the Air, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1982, at
D2, col. 1.
166. Subscribers would set their VCRs to record the scrambled signal. Special decoders
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intends to broadcast magazines, newspapers or catalogues over the air or
by cable for taping on a VCR, and National Public Radio, among others,
has proposed to distribute video games and other computer software to
automatic recording machines.
167
D. Technological and Regulatory Developments That Could Permit More
Efficient Spectrum Use to Produce More Delivery System
Opportunities
1 General Electric Company's Twofor- One Comband System
The General Electric Company Television Division, in November 1982,
announced the development of Comband, an analog compression system
intended to allow transmission of two video program services over a single
cable television channel. 68 As reported in the trade press, "[b]y installing
a Comband encoder at the headend and Comband converters in subscrib-
ers' homes. . . the cable operator can quickly and relatively inexpensively
double the capacity of his own system."' 169 Comband converters are esti-
mated to cost two hundred dollars.
Comband will be marketed initially for the cable television industry, but
GE indicates that the system will have future applications to over-the-air
services such as television, STV, LPTV, MDS, and satellite and microwave
links. 7o If successful, this system could permit an inexpensive doubling of
services provided over the six MHz allocations to broadcast, STV, LPTV,
and MDS licensees.
2 Conversion From Analog to Digital Transmission Techniques
Television signals are normally transmitted in analog "wave" forms
moving across the six MHz frequency range. 7' AT&T, ITT, and others
are developing digital transmission techniques that convert audio and
video signals into "on and off" impulses.'72 Digital transmission permits a
number of different services to be transmitted over the six MHz allocations
through use of multiplexing techniques. 17 The principal disadvantages of
digital systems are the high cost of conversion equipment, and the transi-
tion costs of moving from an analog to a digital approach for existing
167. Id
168. GE's 2for-i Proposition, BROADCASTING, Oct. 18, 1982, at 30.
169. Id
170. Id
171. For a general discussion of the nature of radio waves, see S. HEAD, BROADCASTING
IN AMERICA 25-34 (3d ed. 1976).
172. For a general discussion of digital transmission techniques, see id at 25-27.
173. "Two or more independent signals transmitted simultaneously in the same channel
are said to be multiplexed." Id at 35.
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broadcast communications services. Nonetheless, if sufficient demand for
new transmission delivery systems exists, such digital multiplexing tech-
niques will provide another method of "squeezing" more uses out of the
same frequency allocation.
3. FM Multiolex Subcarriers
On March 31, 1983, the FCC eliminated virtually all technical and non-
technical restrictions upon uses of FM subcarrier frequencies. 74 As a re-
sult of the Commission's decision, FM radio broadcasters are now
permitted to use their subcarriers to transmit material of either a broadcast
or nonbroadcast nature twenty-four hours a day, irrespective of main
channel operation. The Commission action facilitates multiple subcarrier
services by expanding the technical parameters of the FM sideband,
thereby providing two or more audio subcarriers, or several data channels.
Use of FM subcarriers was previously restricted to transmissions of a
broadcast nature, such as background music and specialized information
services. The rule amendments will permit a wide variety of uses, includ-
ing slow scan video services, data transmission, local paging and dispatch-
ing services, municipal traffic light and sign control, page transmission to
nearby printing plants, and electronic mail delivery.
175
4. Shared Use of Broadcast Auxiliary Stations
The Commission recently amended its rules to permit licensees of televi-
sion auxiliary stations to use those facilities to transmit, on a profitmaking
basis, broadcast or nonbroadcast material to other entities. 176 The only
restriction is that the use must be secondary to the primary purpose of the
spectrum allocation, which is transmission of live program feeds to the
associated television station. The Commission's decision enables licensees
to use excess capacity for nonbroadcast purposes, as well as to transmit
program material to cable television systems and other broadcast stations.
The licensee may also, through multiplex techniques, transmit simultane-
ously two video channels, with one feeding the licensee's associated broad-
cast station while the second could be used for alternative purposes.
In giving broadcasters wide latitude to use excess capacity on their
174. FM Subsidiary Communication Authorizations, 53 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1519
(1983). A multiplex subcarrier frequency is adjacent to the main channel frequency. At the
subscriber's end, special receivers are designed to receive the subcarrier signal that is mul-
tiplexed, or mixed into, the main signal.
175. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (BC Docket No. 82-536), 47 Fed. Reg. 36,235
(Aug. 19, 1982).
176. Broadcast Auxiliary Facility Sharing, 53 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1101 (1983).
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broadcast auxiliary facilities, the Commission intended to foster more effi-
cient use of the spectrum, and to encourage the development of spectrum-
efficient technologies such as channel compression. 77 It stated, "[florcing
auxiliary stations to remain idle when legitimate demands for frequencies
exist is precisely the situation that we are attempting to avoid."'
' 7 1
II. THE IMPENDING REGULATORY IDENTITY CRISIS
A. Loss of Scarcity as a Regulatory Rationale
A fundamental tenet of broadcast regulation is the scarcity of broadcast
frequencies. Justice Frankfurter observed in 1943: "the radio spectrum
simply is not large enough to accommodate everybody."'' 7 9 Government
regulation, therefore, has been deemed essential to prevent "etheric bed-
lam." 8 ° In addition, the "inherent physical limitation"'"' of spectrum has
justified the imposition of certain public service obligations upon broad-
casters in return for the "free and exclusive use of a limited and valuable
part of the public domain . ,,182
Apart from natural limitations, the Commission's television allocation
scheme has perpetuated spectrum scarcity. 18 3 The table of assignments
adopted in 1952'1 4 confined television to the VHF and UHF spectrum,'
even though other portions of the spectrum could have been used to trans-
mit video and audio signals to the home. Moreover, due to the nature of
the spectrum, not all of the commercial television channels allocated in
177. Id at 1105.
178. Id
179. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 213 (1943). See also id at
226 ("Unlike other modes of expression, radio inherently is not available to all .... [T]hat
is why, unlike other modes of expression, it is subject to governmental regulation.").
180. Id at 212-13.
181. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. at 101.
182. Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1003
(D.C. Cir. 1966). See also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) ("It does
not violate the First Amendment to treat licensees given the privilege of using scarce radio
frequencies as proxies for the entire community, obligated to give suitable time and atten-
tion to matters of great public concern."); National Broadcasting Co., 319 U.S. at 215-16.
One commentator has expressed a contrary viewpoint: "Spectrum scarcity justifies, if any-
thing, diversity of speech in the broadcast medium, not government censorship." Krat-
tenmaker & Esterow, Censoring Indecent Cable Programs: The New Morality Meets the New
Media, 51 FoRDHAm L. REV. 606, 621 (1983).
183. See NETWORK INQUIRY SPECIAL STAFF, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
NEW TELEvIsION NETWORKS: ENTRY, JURISDICTION, OWNERSHIP AND REGULATION 14-30
(Oct. 1980) [hereinafter cited as NETWORK INQUIRY).
184. Sixth Report and Order on Television Allocation, 41 F.C.C. 148 (1952).
185. Very high frequency (VHF) and ultra high frequency (UHF) are in the 30-3,000
MHz band. See S. HEAD, supra note 171, at 31.
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1952 are available for assignment in each community." 6 As a result, only
three VHF commercial outlets prevail in most markets.
In the years since the scarcity rationale for broadcast regulation was first
articulated, there have been dramatic changes in the video marketplace.
In 1934, for example, there were 583 AM stations and no FM or television
stations on the air.18 7 As of March 1983, there were 4,708 AM stations,
3,421 commercial FM stations and 834 television stations (527 VHF, 307
UHF). 8 There were also 1,090 FM educational radio stations, 175 edu-
cational UHF TV stations, and I I I educational VHF TV stations as of
186. Co-channel and adjacent-channel stations must be separated geographically to
avoid interference. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.610(b)(1) & (c)(1) (1982). UHF operation results in
interference problems, known as "UHF taboos," which may preclude the use of up to 16
channels in a particular area. See Note, UHF and the FCC: The Search for a Televirion
Allocation Policy, 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 394, 402 (1976).
187. See Deregulation of Radio, 73 F.C.C.2d 457, 484 (1979).
188. FCC News Release, Rep. No. 8742 (Apr. 21, 1983). A proposal is pending to in-
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that date. 189 An estimated 28% of television households currently receive
ten or more television stations over the air and 80% receive five or more
signals.' The Commission's television allocation goal--to provide a
choice of at least two television services to all parts of the United
States' 9 1-has largely been met. The authorization of LPTV and DBS will
further make free over-the-air television available nationwide.
The growth of independent stations and the use of satellites for program
distribution have changed the content of broadcast signals. 92 From 1977
to 1980, independent station revenues grew 60%, compared to a 45% in-
crease in network revenues. 93 The use of satellite earth stations by in-
dependent and affiliated network television stations has eroded the
economic advantages of network program distribution 94 and is thus
largely responsible for the changing complexion of television
programming.
Alternatives to conventional television further undermine the scarcity
rationale. Although additional VHF outlets may be foreclosed in the
larger markets, cable, MDS, SMATV, videocassettes, and videodiscs are
increasingly available to American households.' 1 Additionally, LPTV
and DBS will be available within the next few years. Many of these deliv-
ery modes do not utilize broadcast spectrum, and thus are not subject to
the natural limitations upon the use of those frequencies. Moreover, own-
ership of the new technologies is not highly concentrated.
196
crease the number of VHF stations by means of short-spaced television "drop-in" assign-
ments. See Table of TV Channel Allotments, 83 F.C.C.2d 52 (1980).
189. FCC News Release, Rep. No. 8742 (Apr. 21, 1983).
190. J. LEVY & F. SETZER, MEASUREMENT OF CONCENTRATION IN HOME VIDEO MAR-
KETS 81 (Office of Plans and Policy, Dec. 23, 1982) [hereinafter cited as OPP REPORT]. For
a summary of the report, see 48 Fed. Reg. 41 (Jan. 3, 1983).
191. See Sixth Report and Order on Television Allocation, 41 F.C.C. at 160.
192. See BBC Study, supra note 115, at 14-19. The BBC Study documents a decline in
the composite three network share from 90.7% in 1977-1978 to 79.6% in 1981-1982, an ll%
decrease in four seasons. Id at 15; Table II-I at 16. The nonnetwork share has more than
doubled during this period.
193. Id at 64.
194. Id at 64-69. See also OPP REPORT, supra note 190, at 101.
195. The Commission's Office of Plans and Policy has broadly defined the home video
market to encompass all services that deliver information and entertainment into the home.
OPP REPORT, supra note 190, at 101. It concluded that "[a] narrow market definition, ex-
cluding the alternative media, will result in a severe underestimate of actual competition."
Id The BBC Study supports the same conclusion, by demonstrating that network viewing
in cable and pay cable households declines sharply. BBC Study, supra note 115, at 18; Table
11-2, at 17.
196. The deconcentrated nature of the cable market, for example, has been acknowl-
edged by the Commission. See NETWORK INQUIRY, supra note 183, at 111-157-59; FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, OFFICE OF PLANS AND POLICY, FCC POLICY ON CABLE
OWNERSHIP 4 (Nov. 1981).
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Viewing the market as a whole, a large number of competitive alterna-
tives is presently available to consumers. According to one estimate, 42.6
million households are capable of receiving cable television, 32.8 million
are capable of receiving an STV signal and 16.6 million households could
receive MDS. 197 Only 43.9% of the available services are actually used,
198
however, suggesting that supply exceeds demand. The same conclusion
can be drawn from the fact that channels in the VHF and UHF bands,
outside the larger markets, remain unused after more than two decades.1
99
Alternatives to standard television service promise to increase. Basic
cable households are expected to grow from 22.5 million to 47.3 million by
the 1989-90 season.2°' At the same time, pay cable is expected to increase
from 12 million households (14.6%) to 42.5 million households (44.9%) in
1989-90.201 Over-the-air pay television subscribership, including MDS,
STV, SMATV, DBS, and LPTV, also is expected to increase dramatically
over the next eight years, with 12.3 million households (12.9%) projected
by the 1989-90 season.202
The environment is substantially different from that of 1927 when Con-
gress, fearing that a small number of stations and equipment manufactur-
ers were about to monopolize the limited frequencies available, passed the
Radio Act of 1927.203 The above data project a dramatic growth in the
pay video marketplace through the next decade. Moreover, technological
developments could permit more efficient use of spectrum to produce even
more delivery system opportunities. 2" Multiplexing, compression and
197. OPP REPORT, supra note 190, at 84, table 2.
198. Id
199. FCC Public Notice, Release No. 3668 (Apr. 27, 1983). See Fowler & Brenner, A
Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 207, 225 n.81 (1982).
200. BBC STUDY, supra note 115, at 21-24.
201. Id
202. Id See also id at 81-91. STV subscribership, currently estimated at 1.4 million,
could grow to 1.8 million by 1985. Id at 81-83. By 1990, however, STV subscribership is
expected to decline to 1.2 million. Id MDS households now number 570,000, with con-
servative projections of 2.3 million households by 1990. Id at 83-85. SMATV, now in the
100,000 to 250,000 subscriber range, could reach an estimated 500,000 households by 1990.
Id at 85-86. Direct broadcast satellites have the potential to reach about 5.4 million house-
holds by 1990, although some industry observers have predicted penetration of up to I 
million households. Id at 86-88. DBS service could be initiated in the 1983-84 time frame,
with a subscribership of 1.2 million households by 1985. Id Low power television pay
subscribers are projected at 100,000 in 1985, with a maximum of one million by 1990. Id
Use of videocassettes and videodiscs will also increase dramatically according to industry
estimates.
203. For a further discussion of the early history of broadcast regulation, see Deregula-
tion of Radio, 73 F.C.C.2d at 497-98.
204. As one commentator notes, "[t]echnology is an independent variable that makes
scarcity a relative concept." Fowler & Brenner, supra note 199, at 222.
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subcarrier operations are means of providing more than one service over
the same spectrum allocation. As a result of such developments, the scar-
city rationale might no longer be applicable to the emerging media
environment.
B. Blurring of Regulatory Distinctions Between Broadcasting and Other
Services
Technological developments have blurred the distinctions between
broadcasting and other services. To understand the extent to which the
traditional classifications have been strained, it is useful to outline the ba-
sic features of broadcast, cable common carrier, private radio and non-
commercial broadcasting regulation.
1 Regulatory Diferences Based Upon Nature of Service
a Broadcast
The Communications Act of 1934 defines broadcasting as the "dissemi-
nation of radio communications intended to be received by the public, di-
rectly or by the intermediary of relay stations."2 5 The meaning of the
term derives mainly from a comparison with common carrier services,
since, as the Act provides, "a person engaged in radio broadcasting shall
not . . . be deemed a common carrier."2 "6 Broadcasting is also distin-
guished from "point-to-point" communications addressed to one or more
specified reception points.2 ' 7
Broadcasters are regulated under title III of the Communications Act.2°"
Under title III, broadcasters are given broad discretion in determining the
content of the programming they transmit and, with limited exceptions,
are not required to provide access to their stations by others.2' Detailed
technical regulations are imposed upon licensees to prevent interference
with other stations, and to insure maximum service to the community and
205. 47 U.S.C. § 153(o) (1976). See also National Subscription Television v. S&H TV,
644 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1981); Functional Music, Inc. v. FCC, 274 F.2d 543, 548 (D.C. Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 813 (1959); Subscription Television, 15 F.C.C.2d 466, 472
(1968).
206. 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1976).
207. See H.R. REP. No. 1850, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934); S. REP. No. 781, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 3 (1934). See also Subscription Television Service, 3 F.C.C,2d 1, 9 (1966).
([T]he primary touchstone of a broadcast service is the intent of the broadcaster to
provide radio or television program service without discrimination to as many
members of the general public as can be interested in the particular program as
distinguished from a point-to-point message service to specified individuals.)
208. 47 U.S.C. §§ 301-386 (1976).
209. See, e.g., FCC v. WNCN Listeners' Guild, 450 U.S. 582 (1981); CBS v. Democratic
Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
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the nation.2"' The main objectives are spectrum management, compatibil-
ity of receiving and transmitting equipment, and ensuring a high-quality
signal.
Broadcast licensees are considered to be public trustees with a responsi-
bility to provide public service to their communities. To fulfill this obliga-
tion, television broadcasters are required to ascertain the needs, problems,
and interests of their community of license, and to provide responsive pro-
gramming.211 For television stations, the Commission sets guidelines for
overcommercialization and programming categories.212 Other rules pro-
hibit broadcasting lottery information,213 running rigged contests,21 4 and
failing to disclose consideration for material broadcast.21 5 Broadcasters
have specific obligations concerning coverage of political events and is-
sues,216 and they must provide adequate coverage of public affairs.2 17
Broadcast regulation is also concerned with ensuring a diversity of voices.
To this end, the Commission restricts ownership of multiple broadcast sta-
tions218 and cross-ownership of broadcast stations by owners of other com-
munications media.21 9
b. Cable Television
The FCC was initially reluctant to regulate cable television, believing
that it lacked jurisdiction under the Communications Act. In the mid-
1960's, however, the Commission resolved these doubts and embarked
upon a period of active regulation in order to promote nationwide televi-
sion service.22° The Commission's jurisidiction over cable television was
upheld in United States v. Southwestern Cable Co. ,221 insofar as "reason-
210. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.603-73.615 (1982). The Commission has the authority to impose less
than the full complement of technical, behavioral, and structural rules. It recently elimi-
nated ascertainment requirements, nonentertainment programming guidelines, and com-
mercial limits for licensees of commercial radio stations. Deregulation of Radio, 84
F.C.C.2d 968, 971 (1981), afd in part, remanded in part sub norn. Office of Communication
of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, Case No. 81-1032 (D.C. Cir. May 10, 1983) (slip
op.). The Commission also declined to impose many of the traditional broadcast regulations
on LPTV. Low Power Television Serv., 51 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 476 (1982).
211. Ascertainment of Community Problems, 57 F.C.C.2d 418 (1976).
212. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.4010 (1982).
213. Id § 73.1211.
214. Id § 73.1216.
215. Id § 73.1212.
216. New Primer on Political Broadcasting and Cablecasting, 69 F.C.C.2d 2209 (1978).
217. Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974).
218. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.636 (1982).
219. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.636, 76.501(a) (1982).
220. See, e.g., CATV, 2 F.C.C.2d 725 (1966), affd sub nom. Black Hills Video Corp. v.
FCC, 399 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1968).
221. 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
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ably ancillary . . . for the regulation of television broadcasting." 222 The
Supreme Court subsequently applied the "reasonably ancillary" standard
in United States v. Midwest Video Corp. 223 (Midwest Video I) to uphold
FCC rules requiring cable systems to originate programming and to make
available facilities for local production of programs.
The Supreme Court later limited the FCC's jurisdiction over cable tele-
vision in the second Midwest Video case (Midwest Video II).224 It inter-
preted section 3(h) of the Communications Act as preventing imposition of
common carrier-type obligations upon cable operators. In so holding, it
struck down Commission rules requiring systems with more than 3,500
subscribers to provide access channels, to increase capacity to twenty chan-
nels, and to provide two-way non-voice communication.225
Since Midwest Video I, the Commission has retreated from further reg-
ulation of cable systems, and has, in fact, repealed the core of the cable
regulatory structure which was based on an inter-industry consensus
reached in 1972.226 In particular, the Commission rescinded distant signal
carriage and syndicated program exclusivity restrictions on cable retrans-
missions.227 Presently, the FCC ensures nonduplication protection for net-
work and sports programs,228 protects cable systems against excessive
franchise fees, 229 and requires carriage of local broadcast signals by cable
systems.2 30 To the extent that the cable system engages in origination
cablecasting, it must comply with equal time, fairness, lottery, obscenity,
and sponsorship identification requirements.
23'
c. Common Carrier
The Communications Act defines a common carrier as "any person en-
gaged as a common carrier for hire., 232 In wrestling with this circuitous
definition, the courts have concluded that a common carrier holds out, as
available to the entire public for hire, facilities whereby all members of the
public who choose to employ such facilities may transmit intelligence of
222. Id at 178.
223. 406 U.S. 649 (1972).
224. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
225. Id
226. See CATV Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, 79 F.C.C.2d 663 (1980), affldsub
nom. Malrite T.V. v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, sub nonm National Ass'n of
Broadcasters v. FCC, 102 S. Ct. 1002 (1981).
227. CATV Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, 79 F.C.C.2d at 813-15.
228. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.67, 76.92 (1982).
229. Id at § 76.31.
230. Id at §§ 76.57, 76.59, 76.61.
231. Id at §§ 76.206, 76.209, 76.213, 76.215, 76.221.
232. 47 U.S.C § 153(h) (1976).
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their own design.2 33 Although AT&T dominates the domestic common
carrier industry, diverse new entities have entered the market.
Common carriers and common carrier service offerings are regulated
under title II of the Communications Act. Sections 201 and 202 of the
Communications Act outlaw unjust, unreasonable, and discriminatory
practices by common carriers furnishing interstate and foreign communi-
cations.2" The Act also requires the common carrier to file with the FCC
"schedules showing all charges for itself and its connecting carriers for in-
terstate or foreign wire or radio communications ...and showing the
classification, practices, and regulations affecting such charges." '235 The
Commission is empowered to determine the lawfulness of any new or ex-
isting charge, classification, regulation, or practice of a common carrier,
and to prescribe just and reasonable ones.236
A common carrier must obtain a certificate of public convenience and
necessity as a condition precedent to constructing, expanding, or terminat-
ing lines of communication. 237 It must also establish terms and conditions
of the service offering pursuant to a tariff. Common carriers are subject to
rate of return and rate base regulation and may not discriminate unreason-
ably against users.238
d Private Radio
Private radio services "include nationwide and international uses of ra-
dio by persons, businesses, state and local governments, and other organi-
zations licensed to operate their own communications systems for their
own use as an adjunct of their primary business or other activity. 239 Such
233. See National Ass'n of Regulatory Utility Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 640-42
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (NARUC I); National Ass'n of Regulatory Utility Comm'rs v. FCC, 533
F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (NARUC IH). The Commission adopted the NARUC I test for
determining common carrier status in Domestic Fixed Satellite Transponder Sales, 52 Rad.
Reg. 2d (P & F) 79, 87 (1982). It identified two criteria of common carrier status: "(1)
whether there will be any legal compulsion to serve the public indifferently; and (2) if not,
whether there are reasons implicit in the nature of the service to expect an indifferent hold-
ing out to the eligible user public." Id The key features of common carrier regulation are
that services must be provided on a "first come, first served" basis, without discrimination,
and that common carriers cannot influence the content of the messages transmitted, but
must act merely as conduits. The Commission has discretion to forbear from imposing the
full panoply of title II regulations where the entity lacks market dominance. See Competi-
tive Common Carrier Servs., 52 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 187, 189 (1982). See also ACLU v.
FCC, 523 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1975).
234. 47 U.S.C. §§ 201, 202 (1976).
235. 47 U.S.C. § 203(a) (1976).
236. Id at §§ 204, 205 (1976).
237. Id at § 214 (1976).
238. Id at § 203, 205 (1976).
239. 47 C.F.R. § 0.131 (1976).
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services include almost all users of the spectrum that fit neither the broad-
cast nor common carrier model. The regulations are primarily technical
and procedural, because the primary functions of private radio regulation
are to allocate spectrum and to ensure its efficient and orderly use.2"
Unlike broadcast and common carrier regulation, eligibility is usually
restricted to those engaged in a specific activity. These special eligibility
requirements are used as a means of allocating spectrum among classes of
users and controlling the number of users. Technical regulation beyond
allocation and frequency assignment is limited to interference control.24
e. Noncommercial Broadcasting
The FCC has allocated spectrum exclusively for noncommercial broad-
casters (i.e., public radio and television).242 Stations using these reserved
frequencies are licensed by the FCC and, with a few exceptions, are sub-
ject to the same regulations as commercial licensees."' Such licensees
must be nonprofit institutions with a cultural or educational orientation. 2'
Unlike their commercial counterparts, public broadcasters receive gov-
ernment funding. A capital grant program for noncommercial stations
was established in 1962,245 and expanded in 19672" with the creation of
the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB). The Public Broadcasting
Service (PBS), formed in 1970 by CPB and a group of noncommercial
television licensees, operates as the distributive arm of the public television
system, providing national programming to member stations by means of
common carrier facilities.
With the erosion of federal funding, noncommercial stations are explor-
ing new financing options.24 This has led to a relaxation of restrictions
240. See generally DBS REPORT supra note 60, at 53-56.
241. See generally 47 C.F.R. Part 90 (1982). The Commission limits the ways in which
various private radio users can share frequencies and equipment, and also restricts the types
of communications which may be made in the private services.
242. See Sixth Report and Order on Television Allocation, 41 F.C.C. at 158-67, 227-563.
Freeing public broadcasters from profit-oriented commercial pressures is seen as a way to
provide distinctive programs appealing to small, highly differentiated markets.
243. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.621, 73.503 (1982). Public television licensees, for exam-
ple, are not permitted to accept compensation for on-air promotion of the goods and services
of "for-profit" organizations.
244. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.621(a) (1982).
245. Educational Broadcasting Facilities Act, Pub. L. No. 87-447, 76 Stat. 64 (1962).
246. Public Broadcasting Act, Pub. L. No. 90-129, 81 Stat. 365 (1967), 47 U.S.C. §§ 390-
399 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (as amended by the Public Telecommunications Financing Act,
92 Stat. 2405 (1982)). CPB, which was established as a funding mechanism for noncommer-
cial broadcasting, is not itself permitted to engage in communication by wire or radio. Id at
§ 396(g)(3).
247. See Public Broadcasting Amendments Act of 1981, §§ 1231-1233 of the Omnibus
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imposed on such stations. The FCC, for example, has proposed permitting
noncommercial television stations to offer subscription television serv-
ices.24 The Commission also amended its rules to permit public broad-
casters to broadcast logos and to identify product lines of program
underwriters, thus relaxing the prohibition against promotional announce-
ments of any kind.24 9 It has also authorized public TV stations to offer
teletext services on a profitmaking basis.250
2. Emergence of New Technologies Requires New Regulatory
Classtations
The traditional, and discrete, regulatory classifications have been
strained by the advent of new technologies. Direct-to-the-home subscrip-
tion services, such as DBS, MDS and STV, resemble broadcasting in that
the programming is similar to conventional television fare. By transmit-
ting in scrambled form to subscribers, however, these services are akin to
point-to-point communications which are directed to specific reception
points. MDS, which delivers entertainment and information program-
ming, operates as a common carrier. Use of the OFS-a private radio
service--to transmit video programming raises similar issues. Videotex,
which combines features of publishing, broadcasting and computers, is an-
other "hybrid" service calling for a new regulatory approach. The mul-
tichannel video service proposals of entities such as CCC and Microband,
which would use MDS and ITFS frequencies to provide broadcasting, pay
video, common carrier, and other nonbroadcast services, also defy
categorization.
Confronted with these regulatory dilemmas, the Commission's approach
has been to exempt "hybrid" services from provisions that apply to con-
ventional broadcasting on an ad hoc basis, rather than establish a new
regulatory classification. The Commission has employed a "forbearance"
approach comparable to that applied in recent common carrier proceed-
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., which created
the Temporary Commission on Alternative Financing for Public Telecommunications to
explore alternative sources of funding. The Act also authorized public stations "to engage in
the offering of services, facilities, or products in exchange for remuneration" provided that
"any such offering by a public broadcast station shall not interfere with the provision of
public telecommunications services by such stations." id at § 1231.
248. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (BC Docket No. 82-441), 47 Fed. Reg. 36,252 (Aug.
19, 1982). The Commission also has adopted its proposal to allow noncommercial FM sta-
tions to use their subcarrier channels for commercial purposes. See Report and Order (BC
Docket No. 82-1), FCC 83-155, released June 3, 1983. FCC News Release, Rep. No. 17,448
(Apr. 8, 1983).
249. Public Broadcasting Serv., 86 F.C.C.2d 141 (1981).
250. See Teletext Transmission, 53 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1309, 1322 (1983).
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ings,2 51 presuming it has authority to refrain from imposing particular title
III regulations where the public interest warrants. Moreover, in dealing
with new technologies such as DBS, the Commission has articulated an
"experimental" approach, whereby it declines to impose traditional regula-
tory classifications until it is clear how the new service will operate and
whether it will be viable.
252
Although the Commission has, in some instances, eliminated artificial
regulatory distinctions between services delivering comparable program
products, it has in other proceedings perpetuated these distinctions. Admit-
tedly, the FCC has been hampered in its efforts to formulate a consistent
regulatory approach by the statutory obligations imposed by the Commu-
nications Act upon broadcasters.
a. STV
Ever since STV was introduced, the Commission has been troubled by
the appropriate classification for the service, and has attempted to recon-
cile the subscriber relationship with the definition of broadcasting as a
service intended for general public reception.253 Although the Commis-
sion concluded that the subscription operations of radio stations were
point-to-point communications, not broadcasting,254 it reached the oppo-
site conclusion about subscription television. 255 The FCC based its deci-
sion on the STV industry's "intent to provide a radio or television program
service without discrimination to as many members of the general public
as can be interested in the programs. "256
The Commission more recently acknowledged that subscription televi-
251. See, e.g., Competitive Common Carrier Servs., 52 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 187, 189
(1982).
252. For a discussion of the forbearance and experimental authorization approaches in
the DBS context, see Lyons & Hammer, Deregulatory Optionsfor a Direct Broadcast Satellite
System, 33 FED. COMM. L.J. 185 (1981).
253. Adding to the confusion have been a number of court cases interpreting § 605 of the
Communications Act. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1976). That section, which prohibits unauthorized
reception of radio signals, does not apply if the service is classified as broadcasting. Compare
National Subscription Television v. S & H TV, 644 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1981) and Chartwell
Communications Group v. Westbrook, 637 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding that STV
transmissions are not broadcasting and therefore entitled to protection under § 605) with
Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, 474 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (holding that
HBO's MDS transmissions are broadcasting for purposes of § 605).
254. Report and Order (Docket No. 10832), 11 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 1590, 1591 (1956). See
also Functional Music, Inc. v. FCC, 274 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 813
(1959).
255. Subscription Television Serv., 3 F.C.C.2d 1, 9 (1966). See also Subscription Televi-
sion, 15 F.C.C.2d 466, 472 (1968), affd sub nom. National Ass'n of Theater Owners v. FCC,
420 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970).
256. Subscription Television, 15 F.C.C.2d at 472.
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sion may be a hybrid, possessing qualities of both broadcasting and point-
to-point services. In discussing subscription television operations, the
Commission observed:
[Wihile a service authorized by the Commission cannot at the
same time be classified as both broadcasting and common carrier,
it does not follow that all services which may be authorized by
the Commission must be classifiable by the Commission as either
one or the other. There is no question as to the Commission's
authority to authorize the use of radiofrequencies [sic] for numer-
ous kinds of services which are neither broadcast services nor
common carrier services. The safety and special radio services
abound in examples .... "'
Consistent with this approach, the Commission concluded that it had au-
thority to exempt subscription broadcast services from regulatory provi-
sions that apply to conventional broadcasting.2"' It so held in the Third
Report and Order in Docket 21502259 which, among other things, relieved
STV operators of ascertainment and conventional programming require-
ments. In eliminating these "behavioral" rules, the Commission compared
STV to other pay services such as cable which are not hampered by tradi-
tional broadcast regulation.2 °
b. DBS
The Commission opted for a flexible regulatory approach in its interim
rules for DBS.26' It declined to specify a particular service classification,
emphasizing the need to gather experimental data as to whether, for exam-
ple, "satellite operators find it most feasible to operate as broadcasters,
common carriers, private radio operators, or some combination or variant
of these classifications. 26 2 In the meantime, the appropriate regulatory
approach will be determined on an ad hoc basis.
The appropriate statutory provisions will depend on the specific
characteristics of the service each applicant proposes, including
257. Amendment of Part 3-Subscription Television, 23 F.C.C. 532, 541 (1957).
258. See Greater Washington Educ. Telecommunications Ass'n, 49 F.C.C.2d 948 (1974)
(fairness doctrine, personal attack, and political broadcast rules not applicable); Subscrip-
tion TV Serv., 90 F.C.C.2d 341 (1982). See generaly DBS REPORT, supra note 60, at App.
C.
259. 90 F.C.C.2d 341 (1982).
260. See also Subscription Television Movie Restrictions, 41 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1491
(1977) (restrictions on feature films); Subscription Television Rules, 42 Rad. Reg. 2d (P &
F) 1207 (1978) (restrictions on sports events); Enforcing Section 312(a)(7), 68 F.C.C.2d 1079,
1093 (1978) (exempting STV operators from § 312 requirements).
261. Direct Broadcast Satellites, 90 F.C.C.2d 676, 708 (1982), appealpending sub nomL
National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. FCC, Case Nos. 82-1926, 82-2233 (D.C. Cir.).
262. Direct Broadcast Satellites, 90 F.C.C.2d at 708-09.
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the proposed method of financing, whether the service would be
offered to the general public, and the degree of control the appli-
cant would exercise over program content. If the proposal falls
within any of the conventional regulatory classifications for radio
services, i.e., broadcast, common carrier or private radio, we will
impose the statutory requirements of that service.263
Departing from the traditional approach, whereby utilization of spec-
trum allocated to a particular service defines the appropriate regulatory
approach, the Commission indicated that a DBS applicant could choose
the manner in which it would be regulated. Direct-to-home subscription
services, over which the applicant retains control of the transmission con-
tent, would generally be classified as broadcast services. 2" On the other
hand, if a DBS applicant chooses to operate as a common carrier, it must
offer its satellite transmission facilities indiscriminately to the public pur-
suant to tariff, under title II of the Communications Act.265 Under this
approach, a DBS operator could "function as a broadcaster with respect to
some channels and a common carrier with respect to others." 2
The DBS proceeding also raised the question of how to regulate pro-
grammers who provide service directly to the public through facilities and
frequencies licensed to a common carrier. The existing regulatory scheme,
which clearly distinguishes broadcasters from common carriers, does not
address this problem. The Commission concluded that Congress did not
intend that customers of common carrier operators be licensed and regu-
lated as broadcasters. It cited the fact that similar systems, such as MDS,
which provide subscription programming services to individual residences,
were not subjed to traditional broadcast regulation.267 In so concluding,
the Commission essentially permitted DBS channel programmers to avoid
the same basic responsibilities and limitations as their counterpart terres-
trial broadcasters, including the broadcast multiple ownership rules.
c. Electronic Publishing
Teletext, which combines characteristics of publishing and broadcasting,
also poses regulatory dilemmas.268 On the one hand, teletext resembles the
263. Direct Broadcast Satellite Servs., 86 F.C.C.2d 719, 750-51 n.64 (1981). See also
Direct Broadcast Satellites, 90 F.C.C.2d at 709.
264. Direct Broadcast Satellites, 90 F.C.C.2d at 709.
265. Id The Commission, however, begged the question of how "common carrier" will
be defined. See, e.g., Domestic Fixed Transponder Satellite Sales, 52 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F)
79 (1982), where the Commission concluded that transponder sales are not common carrier
offerings.
266. Direct Broadcast Satellites, 90 F.C.C.2d at 709.
267. Id at 710.
268. FCC Commissioner Anne Jones has proposed "a single regulatory treatment" for
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print media which is free from government regulation of programming
content. On the other hand, broadcasters who lease transmission time to
teletext operators may have little meaningful control over the program-
ming transmitted, and therefore, resemble common carriers. In a third
scenario, the teletext transmission may be inextricably linked to the broad-
cast material, as where a program schedule or subtitles are transmitted. In
authorizing the service, the Commission addressed these regulatory
implications.269
From all appearances, the Commission intends to perpetuate the tradi-
tional common carrier and broadcast distinctions in regulating teletext.
The novel aspect of the Commission's approach is that broadcasters may,
in certain circumstances, be subjected to common carrier or private radio
regulation. The licensee who uses the VBI for teletext would be responsi-
ble for all transmissions of a broadcast nature. Nonbroadcast teletext ac-
tivities, which resemble private radio or common carrier services, will be
regulated according to the appropriate regulatory structure and rules.2 7 °
The licensee bears the responsibility of determining which regulatory clas-
sification applies.
The decision is significant in acknowledging that teletext's "unique
blending of the print medium with radio technology fundamentally distin-
guishes it from traditional broadcast programming," and for exempting
the service from political broadcasting and fairness requirements on those
grounds.271 The Commission did not, however, eliminate the fundamental
discrepancy in regulatory treatment based upon the delivery system uti-
lized. If teletext is delivered by MDS, for example, it would be free from
content regulation as a common carrier service. In contrast, the television
licensee who uses the VBI for teletext would be required to retain control
over all material transmitted in a broadcast mode with the right to reject
any material that it deems inappropriate or undesirable.272
broadcast and print media using the print model. She predicts that "[new] services like
teletext and videotext ... may provide the catalyst for change from the present regulatory
scheme." Remarks of Commissioner Anne P. Jones Before the American Newspaper Pub-
lishers Ass'n, FCC News Release, Rep. No. 07762 (Mar. 5, 1981).
269. See Teletext Transmission, 53 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1309 (1983).
270. Id at 1324-27. The Commission indicated that common carriage treatment will
depend upon the manner in which the licensee conducts its business (i.e., whether the broad-
caster holds out its transmission facilities to all people indifferently or whether it establishes
stable, long-term contractual relationships with customers who are selected on a highly indi-
vidualized basis). An analogous approach was utilized in the FM subcarrier proceeding,
and in the Commission's decision authorizing sale of excess capacity by television auxiliary
stations. See supra notes 174-78 and accompanying text.
271. Id at 1322-24.
272. Id at 1321.
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Videotex raises additional regulatory issues when telephone lines are
employed as a means of transmission.273 Use of cable to transmit videotex
is also a murky area. It is, for example, unclear whether the Commission's
"ancillary" jurisdiction extends to teletext and videotex services provided
by cable systems. Another open question is whether the content regula-
tions applicable to "origination cablecasting" could be invoked. To date,
the Commission has not sought to regulate cable videotex.
III. LESS IS MORE-THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN INDUSTRY CHANGES
AND REGULATORY PHILOSOPHY
A4. Regulatory Developments Responsive to Rapidly Changing
Characteristics of the Industry
As growth in the video marketplace has undermined the traditional ra-
tionale for, and regulatory distinctions of, mass media law, the FCC has
increasingly relied upon natural market forces to effectuate the policy
objectives underlying its regulatory scheme. While the premise of this arti-
cle is that technological change has driven the FCC's current deregulatory
efforts, this section notes the congressional and internal agency actions that
have also played a role.
1. Institutional Changes
a. Rewriting the Communications Act
Congressional actions have influenced the Commission's regulatory phi-
losophy, and have reflected changes in industry characteristics. During the
period 1976-1980, Representative Lionel Van Deerlin, Chairman of the
House Communications Subcommittee, proposed a "basement to attic" re-
write of the Communications Act.274 Although Van Deerlin's rewrite bill
was not adopted, the introduction of other rewrite bills and the debate they
elicited has had a significant impact on communications policy. For exam-
ple, congressional oversight of the FCC's actions improved. Former FCC
Commissioner Glen Robinson observed:
As part of a studied effort over the last two years to review and
revise the entire legislative mandate of the FCC, the Subcommit-
tee on Communications and its staff have shown greater atten-
tiveness to, and more understanding of, important policy issues
273. See Second Computer Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980), afdsub noft Computer &
Communications Industry Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
274. For a detailed discussion of this effort, see E. KRASNOW, L. LONOLEY & H. TERRY,
THE POLrrlcs OF BROADCAST REGULATION 240-69 (3d ed. 1982).
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than has been evident for at least twenty years .... 21
Robert Bruce, former FCC General Counsel, said he regards the "rewrite
process" as having "an enormous impact" on the development of substan-
tive policies by the Commission.27 6
The rewrite proposals, by threatening the FCC's survival, spurred the
agency to action. The Commission adopted major decisions deregulating
radio,277 cable television,2 78 and earth station licensing. 79 The FCC also
took several bold initiatives providing open entry and deregulation in the
common carrier industry.28° With respect to the provision of new broad-
casting outlets, the FCC "dropped in" four VHF television channels,
28 '
created a new low power television service,282 and authorized a direct-to-
home satellite broadcast service.283 Van Deerlin and many other Wash-
ington, D.C. observers concluded that the FCC's bold actions "would have
been impossible without the thunder and lightning sparked by those first
two comprehensive bills."' 28 The Commission implemented administra-
tively the rewrite's legislative goals of deregulation and increased market-
place competition, thus taking some of the steam out of the drive for
legislation and establishing the agency in a leadership role.
b. Federal Paperwork Policy
The congressionally-mandated goal of federal paperwork reduction has
influenced recent deregulatory efforts. In recognition of mounting and un-
precedented paperwork burdens, Congress in 1974 determined that a re-
newed effort was necessary to control federal information requests, and
created a Commission on Federal Paperwork to study the federal govern-
ment's information gathering activities.28 In 1980, incorporating many of
the Paperwork Commission's recommendations, Congress enacted the
"Paperwork Reduction Act," which set a statutory goal of reducing the
275. Robinson, The Federal Communications Commission: An Essay on Regulatory
Watchdogs, 64 VA. L. REV. 169, 182 (1978).
276. Interview with Robert Bruce, Wash., D.C. (July 8, 1981).
277. Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968, affid in part, remanded in part, Office of
Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, Case No. 81-1032 (D.C. Cir. May
10, 1983).
278. See Malrite T.V. v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1981).
279. Reregulation of Receive-Only Domestic Earth Stations, 74 F.C.C.2d 205 (1979).
280. For a discussion of these common carrier decisions, see Brenner, Communications
Regulation in the Eighties: The Vanishing Drawbridge, 33 AD. L. REv. 255 (1981).
281. VHF TV Top 100 Market, 81 F.C.C.2d 233 (1980).
282. Low Power Television Serv., 51 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 476 (1982).
283. Direct Broadcast Satellites, 90 F.C.C.2d 676 (1982).
284. Van Deerlin, Progress Made Via "Rewrite" Dialog, VAIETY, Jan. 9, 1980, at 213.
285. Commission on Federal Paperwork, Pub. L. No. 93-556, § l(a), (c), 88 Stat. 1789
(1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. at 2057, 2058.
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burden of existing information demands upon the public 15 percent by
October 1, 1982, and an additional 10 percent the following year.
28 6
c. Creating a Mass Media Bureau
On September 14, 1982, the FCC created a Mass Media Bureau, provid-
ing a single, integrated organizational structure for administering policies
regarding broadcasting, cable television, and emerging video technolo-
287 bugies. The bureau, which replaced the Broadcast and Cable Television
Bureaus, includes a Video Services Division with branches for cable,
broadcast television, LPTV, DBS, and other technologies.
The Commission said the Bureau was established:
To reflect new regulatory philosophies and emerging technolo-
gies . . . . This reorganization creates an integrated organiza-
tional structure for the administration of Commission policies
regarding traditional broadcasting, cable television and the
emerging television delivery systems, by combining these essen-
tially similar consumer services into a single Bureau. The Com-
mission believes that this consolidation will result in: (1) faster
and more efficient authorization of service; (2) reduction of dupli-
cate recordkeeping; (3) less confusion about FCC services among
consumers; (4) greater flexibility of staff utilization; and (5) more
orderly development of emerging television delivery
technologies.288
Consolidation of video services under one bureau reflects the public per-
ception of these services as substitutable options for entertainment and in-
formational programming. The integrated organizational structure will
also aid the Commission in developing and administering overall policies
for video services.
d Regulation Based on Economic Theory
The FCC's conception of a wide-open video marketplace and the result-
ing structural changes within the agency are rooted in actions taken by
President Carter's FCC chairman, Charles Ferris. Ferris in effect trans-
formed the Office of Plans and Policy into an office of "Chief Economist."
He introduced a substantial number of economists into the highest levels
286. Pub. L. No. 96-511, § 2(a), 94 Stat. 2818 (44 U.S.C.A. § 3505, West Supp. Dec.
1981). Between fiscal years 1981 and 1982, the FCC reduced by nearly 65 percent the
paperwork burdens it places on the public, making it the single most successful agency in the
federal government in eliminating unnecessary paperwork. Council of Independent Regula-
tory Agencies, Regulation Relief at the Independent Regulatory Agencies (Nov. 1982) at 19.
287. Order, 47 Fed. Reg. 47,828 (Oct. 28, 1982).
288. Id at 47,829.
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of FCC decisionmaking and created an atmosphere in which past legal
structures for broadcast regulation were challenged by economic models
favoring open entry for new technologies.28 9 His legacy includes the Net-
work Inquiry Special Staff Report which has served as the basis for many
of the recent deregulatory initiatives.
The current chairman, Mark Fowler, has also endorsed an open entry
philosophy, whereby "new players [are] encouraged to come into the
field.''290 Calling the FCC the "last of the new deal dinosaurs,",29 ' Fowler
advocates a marketplace approach "where the marketplace rather than the
myths of a trusteeship approach determines what programming the Ameri-
can people receive on radio and television and who provides it."' 292 Fowler
coined the term "unregulation" to characterize the principle that should
guide the Commission's efforts:
[S]imply it means that we examine every regulation on the books
and ask, 'Is it really necessary?' If, in our judgment, it has out-
lived its usefulness, we must make every effort to get rid of it.
This approach is in harmony with the concept that government
should eliminate unnecessary regulation of business and
society.
293
2. Implementation of the Markelplace Approach
a. Radio Deregulation
The analysis employed in the FCC's radio deregulation decision has
served as a basis for the "marketplace approach" employed in later de-
regulatory actions. In that proceeding,294 the Commission eliminated its
internal processing guidelines which required full Commission considera-
tion of any renewal application proposing less than 8% (AM stations) or
6% (FM stations) nonentertainment programming, or proposing to broad-
cast more than eighteen minutes of commercial matter per hour. Formal-
289. See E. KRASNOW, L. LONGLEY & H. TERRY, supra note 274, at 46.
290. Id at 26; see also Fowler & Brenner, supra note 199, at 246-48.
291. Fowler, Broadcast Unregulation in the 1980's, TELEVISION QUARTERLY 8-9 (Spring
1982). See also Fowler & Brenner, supra note 199, at 256.
292. Fowler, supra note 291, at 30. See also Statement of Mark S. Fowler Before the
Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance, Oversight Hearing
on the Broadcast-Mass Media Activities of the Federal Communications Commission (Dec.
1, 1982).
293. Fowler, supra note 291, at 29-30.
294. Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968 (1981), af'd inpart, remanded inpart Office
of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, Case No. 81-1032 (D.C. Cir. May
10, 1983). The court remanded that aspect of the decision eliminating program logs and
instructed the FCC to conduct a further proceeding to determine what records should be
retained to demonstrate service to the community.
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istic requirements for ascertainment of community leaders and for a
general public survey were also eliminated for commercial radio licensees.
The Commission cited present market conditions in the radio industry
as the basis for deregulation. In particular, the agency noted the dramatic
growth of the radio industry, of FM radio service, and of alternative
sources of informational programming. 295 It stressed that the increased
number of outlets has lead, in turn, to increased specialization and compe-
tition in the radio marketplace.296 Radio, the Commission concluded, has
been largely transformed into a specialized medium, offering program-
ming geared to narrower audiences.297
The Commission concluded that its public interest mandate compelled it
to review and modify its regulations in light of changes in the radio indus-
try. Indeed, it observed, "failure to so do could constitute less than ade-
quate performance of our regulatory mission., 298 The Commission stated:
It is well settled that [the public interest] standard was deliber-
ately placed into the Act by Congress so as to provide the Com-
mission with the maximum flexibility in dealing with the ever
changing conditions in the field of broadcasting. Moreover, a
wide latitude has been provided the Commission to modify its
regulations in the face of such changes. We believe that it is en-
tirely consistent with our authority, and our mandate, to consider
the changes in broadcasting that have occurred, at an ever accel-
erating pace, over the past half century, and to adapt our rules
and policies to those changes.
299
In addition to establishing the Commission's authority to adapt its regula-
tions to changing characteristics of the industry, the decision also demon-
295. 84 F.C.C.2d at 969.
296. See Deregulation of Radio, 73 F.C.C.2d 457, 486 (1979):
mhe dramatic growth in the number of radio stations, particularly FM, has not
simply represented an increase in the number of fringe or marginal stations in
urban areas, but rather has increased the number of strong, viable competitors in
these markets. This kind of competition tends to force stations, in their own self
interest, to be responsive to shifts in consumer tastes or else lose their audience to
more responsive stations.
297. See, id at 487-91; Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d at 969, 1065-66 ("the eco-
nomic theory that holds that an increase in the number of stations promotes service to nar-
rower and narrower segments of the community is correct.") See also STAFF OF HOUSE
SUBCOMM. ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND FINANCE, TELECOM-
MUNICATIONS IN TRANSmON: THE STATUS OF COMPETITION IN THE TELECOMMUNICA-
TIONS INDUSTRY, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 340 (1981); FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S.
582, 590 (1981) ("competition among broadcasters had already produced 'an almost bewil-
dering array of diversity' in entertainment formats").




strates that marketplace forces, rather than government regulation, can act
as an incentive for licensees to provide program diversity.
In this regard, the format case, FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild,300 is also
significant. The Supreme Court upheld the Commission's decision to rely
upon market forces rather than government supervision to promote diver-
sity in entertainment programming. The Commission had concluded that
FCC review of format changes in license renewal or transfer cases was
unwarranted. 3°' The Commission labelled the market the "allocation
mechanism of preference for entertainment formats," noting that competi-
tion had already produced a "bewildering array of diversity" in entertain-
ment formats.30 2 It added that the market is more flexible than government
regulation and responds more quickly to changing public tastes.30 3 The
Supreme Court upheld the FCC's conclusion that "its statutory duties are
best fulfilled by not attempting to oversee format changes."3 "4
b. LPTV
The LPTV proceeding illustrates a situation in which the FCC has de-
termined that "marketplace forces" will fulfill the policy objectives under-
lying conventional broadcast regulation. 30 5  This decision, therefore,
establishes a framework for further deregulation.
In authorizing LPTV service, the Commission adopted minimal pro-
gramming requirements for licensees. As a result, LPTV stations need not
comply with the formal ascertainment, minimum hours of operation, pro-
gram log, and programming requirements applicable to full service televi-
sion stations except where compelled by statute.3°  The Commission
reasoned that "government surveillance" of LPTV stations would interfere
with marketplace conditions.3 °7 Given the limited coverage areas of LPTV
stations, the FCC concluded that responsiveness to local needs would be a
condition of economic survival. The technical nature of the new service,
the Commission observed, also warranted departure from the general prin-
ciple of broadcast regulation that all elements of the community be pro-
vided with program service. 308  For these reasons, the agency left
300. 450 U.S. 582 (1981).
301. Entertainment Formats, 60 F.C.C.2d 858 (1976), reconsideration denied, 66 F.C.C.2d
78 (1977).
302. 450 U.S. at 590.
303. Id
304. Id at 595.
305. Low Power Television Serv., 51 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 476, 484-85 (1982).
306. Id at 518-20.
307, Id at 518-19.
308. Id at 513-17.
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programming decisions to the discretion of licensees, and to the demands
of the marketplace:
In many instances, particularly in rural or remote areas, low
power stations will be set up specifically to fill local needs. In
areas where the marketplace demands coverage of local events of
common interest, licensees can be expected to provide it. In some
urban markets, unserved ethnic enclaves may be targeted for low
power service. But in a major market that already receives ade-
quate local coverage from several full service stations, a low
power licensee may discover and attempt to fill a need for addi-
tional national news, sports or entertainment programming.
Such judgments properly are left to licensees; it is in their inter-
est, and the public's, to garner audience by attempting to serve
unmet needs.
3°9
The Commission also adopted flexible ownership policies for the new
service, dispensing with limits on the maximum number of stations permit-
ted in common ownership, and with the restrictions on ownership by ex-
isting broadcast licensees in their markets. Due to the uncertain viability
of the new service, it concluded that the possible loss of new entrants
would be outweighed by the benefit of permitting experienced broadcast-
ers to develop the service initially.
c. Cable Television Deregulation
In June 1981, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed the Commission's decision to deregulate cable television by re-
scinding the distant signal and syndicated program exclusivity rules.31°
The distant signal rules limited the number of signals from distant stations
(beyond thirty-five miles of the cable system's community) that a cable
system could retransmit to its subscribers, in order to protect local sta-
tions.31 The syndicated program exclusivity rules authorized local televi-
sion stations, which had purchased exclusive exhibition rights to a
program, to demand that local cable systems delete that program from dis-
tant signals. 3 " The extent of this protection varied according to market
size, program type, and time of showing.313 The Commission based cable
deregulation upon several econometric and case studies concerning the im-
309. Id at 518-19.
310. Malrite T.V. v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1143
(1982).
311. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.59(b)-(e), 76.61(b)-(f), 76.63 (1980).
312. Id at §§ 76.151-76.161.
313. For a summary of the history of FCC regulation of cable television, see Besen &




pact of cable television on local station audiences and future cable pene-
tration rates.31 4 It found that deregulation would have a negligible impact
on local broadcast stations, and would, in fact, increase viewing options for
consumers due to the greater availability of expanded cable services.
The Commission also cited the imposition by Congress of copyright lia-
bility upon cable television systems as a justification for deregulation.
31 5
In 1976, Congress established a compulsory licensing system, under which
cable operators would be permitted to retransmit programs without con-
sent of the copyright owners, in return for payment of a prescribed royalty
fee based upon the system's gross revenues and its carriage of distant sig-
nals.31 6 The Commission felt enactment of this statutory scheme elimi-
nated the need for regulations that had served as proxies for the copyright
liability which courts had refused to impose upon cable systems.31 7
Since deletion of those rules, it appears that copyright royalties may, in
fact, operate to limit carriage of distant signals and syndicated program-
ming. The Copyright Royalty Tribunal substantially increased the rates
that cable operators must pay for broadcasting such signals.3" This eco-
nomic factor may cause many cable systems to drop the programming they
picked up after the Malrite decision and substitute other, made-for-cable
program services for some distant television signals.3 19
d Subscription Television Deregulation
The Commission deregulated subscription television in four significant
respects in an effort to give free play to marketplace forces: (1) it elimi-
nated the "complement-of-four" rule that restricted STV operation to
communities primarily served by at least five commercial television sta-
tions including the STV operator; (2) it deleted the requirement that STV
stations broadcast at least twenty-eight hours of conventional program-
314. See, e.g., Economic Relationship Between TV Broadcasting and CATV, 71
F.C.C.2d 632 (1979). The Report concluded that cable penetration might, at most, reach 48%
of all households, id at 672; that the presence of cable television would reduce local station
audiences by less than 10%; and that the incremental audience diversion caused by eliminat-
ing the signal carriage rule would be less than 10%. Id at 674. It should be noted that the
study dealt with retransmission of over-the-air signals, not pay cable, and was conducted
before most cities were wired for cable.
315. CATV Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, 79 F.C.C.2d 663, 763-64 (1980).
316. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
317. See CATV Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, 79 F.C.C.2d at 763-64.
318. Federal Communication Commission's Deregulation of the Cable Industry, 47 Fed.
Reg. 52,146 (Nov. 19, 1982).
319. The "superstations" such as WTBS, Atlanta; WOR-TV, New York; and WGN-TV,
Chicago, which have grown 50% since Mairite, could be the hardest hit. See Cox's San
Diego System to Drop Superstation, COMMUNICATIONS DAILY, Dec. 23, 1982, at 4; Feeling
the Weight of the CRT Signal Fee Increases, BROADCASTING, Jan. 10, 1983, at 31-32.
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ming per week; (3) it decided to permit operators to sell, as well as lease,
decoders; and (4) it relieved STV licensees from ascertainment obligations
with respect to STV programming.
320
The "complement-of-four" rule was originally adopted to assure that
pay TV would not replace an existing free service or utilize a vacant chan-
nel that would otherwise be available for a conventional station. The Com-
mission later concluded, however, that current market conditions ensure
that conventional programming would not be significantly impaired by
eliminating the rule. Moreover, the Commission observed that the rule
placed STV licensees at a competitive disadvantage compared to pay cable
operators.32'
The "28 hour" rule, also designed to ensure the availability of conven-
tional programming, mandated that a minimum amount of such program-
ming be broadcast by STV stations. In deleting this requirement, the
Commission noted that the "mix of conventional and pay programming
might better be determined by the judgment of the individual entrepreneur
and the demands of the marketplace, '322 rather than by "an arbitrary gov-
ernment rule."323 The rule, in the Commission's view, served no public
interest function, and its elimination would result in greater programming
diversity by enabling the licensee to make programming determinations in
response to audience demands.
Other elements of STV deregulation were also motivated by the FCC's
analysis of the video marketplace. The decision to permit the sale of de-
coders, over the objections of system operators concerned about piracy,
was influenced by the fact that "other pay technologies, such as cable, are
offered on a lease or purchase basis .... ,32' Elimination of ascertain-
ment obligations for STV licensees also reflected a marketplace approach.
The Commission stated:
320. Subscription TV Serv., 90 F.C.C.2d 341 (1982).
321. The growth of pay cable and other pay services provides a compelling reason
for removing restrictions to the introduction of STV. In facing the competition
offered by pay cable, STV stations are at a potential disadvantage because they
operate on a single channel, whereas cable offers multiple channels. It has been
found that pay services which enter a market first have an advantage over similar
types of services which follow. We do not believe that the public interest is served
by a regulation which restricts market entry by one pay service but leaves those
markets open to others. Rather, the public is best served by allowing interested
parties to establish STV stations wherever they believe a market exists and a chan-
nel is available.
Id at 350 (citations omitted).
322. Id at 351.
323. Id at 353.
324. Subscription Television Serv., 88 F.C.C.2d 213, 231-32 (1981).
[Vol. 32:529
New Video Marketplace
[We believe that ascertaining the community's STV interest can
be more than adequately accomplished by the operation of the
marketplace. It seems evident that consumers subscribe only to
those pay television systems offering programs meeting their STV
interests. It is clearly in the operator's best interest to fashion sta-
tion offerings to meet those needs.3 25
In sum, this recent deregulatory decision is significant in recognizing that
STV competes with alternative forms of home video entertainment such as
cable, pay cable and MDS, and that the STV licensee must be placed on
an equal footing with its competitors.
e. Common Carrier Deregulation
The FCC has taken deregulatory action in the common carrier field that
parallels its marketplace approach in the broadcast area. In its Second
Computer Inquiry (Computer !), the Commission eliminated regulation of
data processing and telephone equipment offerings by common carriers.326
Instead, the Commission decided to limit common carrier regulation to
"basic transmission services," defined as the provision of pure transmission
facilities indifferent to the information transmitted.327 Any offering that is
more than a basic transmission service is considered an "enhanced service"
not subject to common carrier regulation.328 The Commission also de-
cided that all new customer premises equipment (CPE) would be offered
on an unregulated basis after January 1, 1983.
The decision reflects the Commission's recognition that any new attempt
to formulate regulatory distinctions between communications and data
processing would be quickly outdated by technological advances further
blurring the already elusive boundary. The Commission identified several
advantages in forbearing from regulation of enhanced services. First, it
would be able to focus its regulatory efforts on the underlying basic ser-
vices clearly covered by the Communications Act, and would be relieved
of the time consuming chore of ad hoc determinations to distinguish en-
hanced services which may arise from future technological advances. Sec-
ond, it would provide maximum flexibility to service vendors in
structuring their enhanced offerings to meet individualized customer needs
without fear of overstepping some arbitrary boundary delineating the reg-
ulated from the unregulated. Third, consumers would benefit from the
additional economies-of-scale that would be likely to result from the
325. Id at 231-32.
326. Second Computer Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980), affd sub nom. Computer &
Communications Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
327. 77 F.C.C.2d at 419-20.
328. Id at 420.
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greater use of the basic telecommunications network.329
More recently, the FCC concluded that it has the authority to forbear
from regulating common carrier services under appropriate circum-
stances. 330 In particular, title II regulatory requirements may be waived
"[w]here [the FCC] determine[s] that the cost of such regulation out-
weigh[s] any perceivable benefits. 331 Initially, this authority will be exer-
cised to eliminate section 214332 and tariff requirements with respect to
certain "pure resellers," (i.e., carriers that do not own any transmission
facilities). This action represents a limited first step toward deregulation
that is probably intended to serve as a court test for the FCC's newly as-
serted discretion to forbear from regulating common carriers under the
Communications Act.
f. Technical Standards
A marketplace approach has prevailed in several recent proceedings in-
volving technical standards for new communications services. These pro-
ceedings are AM stereo, DBS and teletext.
After a half decade of deliberations, the FCC decided to allow the mar-
ketplace to determine the AM stereo system or systems best suited for
United States broadcasting.333 Faced with five competing systems pro-
posed by five different manufacturers, the Commission elected simply to
set minimum performance standards that all five systems would be capable
of meeting.334
In pursuing its "marketplace" approach, the FCC candidly recognized
that its failure to select a system could mean that no system would be
adopted widely enough to sustain AM stereo in the market.335 The Com-
mission, however, viewed this outcome as preferable to one in which the
government, by endorsing a particular technical system, guarantees its suc-
cess. 3 3 6 Governmental interference with normal market development, in
the Commission's view, would have to be justified by extraordinary cir-
cumstances. The Commission observed:
329. Id at 425-30.
330. Common Carrier Services, 91 F.C.C.2d 59 (1982).
331. Id at 61. See also Domestic Fixed Satellite Transponder Sales, 52 Rad. Reg. 2d (P
& F) 79 (1982).
332. 47 U.S.C. § 214 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (requiring common carriers to obtain a
certificate of convenience and necessity).
333. AM Stereophonic Broadcasting, 51 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1 (1982).
334. Id The Commission adopted a similar "open environment" for teletext. See FCC
News Release Rep. No. 17,427 (Apr. 1, 1983).




A very strong case would have to be made in order to override
the inherent benefits of consumers making their own choices
rather than having their decisions made by government ...
[O]ur society generally has not seen fit to supplant the free deci-
sions of consumers with those imposed by government, and there
is no convincing reason why AM radio represents a special
case.
337
The Commission employed a similar "open marketplace" approach in
the DBS and teletext proceedings. The Commission declined to impose
technical standards upon DBS systems since, in its view, such standards
could stifle development of the new service. 3 38 A flexible approach was
perceived as the best way to permit DBS operators to respond to advances
in technology, and to encourage the introduction of new services.33 9
In the teletext area, the Commission also concluded that choice of a
technical system should be left to the discretion of individual licensees. 34
The Commission pointed out that an open market approach will allow
licensees the freedom of choice necessary to operate teletext services tai-
lored to their own specific situations and to respond to changes in demand
and technical options.34' The open market approach, in its view, provides
a mechanism for resolving the trade-offs among system features and prices
that are extremely difficult for regulatory decisionmakers to resolve. Addi-
tionally, the Commission believed that its approach would hasten intro-
duction of the service, by avoiding years of delay, while the FCC
attempted to specify standards for a single system.342
g. Ownership Policies
(1) Elimination of the Trafficking Rule
On November 18, 1982, the Commission deleted the "trafficking"
rule,343 concluding that in the present competitive environment, the public
337. Id See generally, Sterling, The FCC and Changing Technological Standards, J. OF
COMM. 137 (Autumn 1982). See also The Odd Couple, BROADCASTING, Nov. 29, 1982, at 40;
Technology. Waiting for the Marketplace, BROADCASTING, Jan. 3, 1983, at 80.
338. Direct Broadcast Satellites, 90 F.C.C.2d at 716-17.
339. Id
340. See Teletext Transmission, 53 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 1309, 1327-28 (1983).
341. Id
342. Id
343. Transfer of Broadcast Facilities, 52 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1081 (1982). In 1962, the
FCC adopted a rule on "trafficking" requiring that applications for license assignments or
transfer of stock control must be designated for hearing, unless the license had been held for
at least three years. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3597(a)-(d) (1982). The Commission defined "traffick-
ing" in broadcast licenses and permits as the licensee's acquisition of a station "for the pur-
pose of reselling it at a profit rather than for the purpose of rendering a public service."
Powel Crosley, Jr., 11 F.C.C. 3, 23 (1945).
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interest will be served best by allowing marketplace forces to regulate sta-
tion sales.3" Under the new approach, broadcast licensees, who obtain
their licenses through means other than the comparative hearing process,
are no longer required to hold their licenses for a particular period before
those licenses can be sold for a profit.345
The FCC's decision, characterized by Chairman Fowler as "a true
blockbuster in the unregulation process," 346 marks a significant step for-
ward in the Commission's overall policy of increased reliance on market-
place forces rather than restrictive regulation to achieve its public interest
objectives.347 Chairman Fowler has pointed out that "we generally reward
those who buy an ailing company and, having turned its fortunes around,
sell it. Under a trusteeship approach it is conduct unbecoming a public
steward; under a market approach it is conduct rewarded by profit on
resale. 348
Consistent with Chairman Fowler's view, the Commission's "traffick-
ing" decision finds profit and public service to be compatible. Responding
to the concern that "a licensee who acquired a station with a primary inter-
est in imminent resale would work to increase the station's resale value
rather than making a meaningful effort to provide programming in the
public interest, ' 349 the Commission observed that marketplace forces
would mitigate against such a result. "[I]n broadcasting, like any other
business, important services can be performed by people who trade broad-
cast properties, rehabilitate ailing stations with new capital and ideas or
relieve unwilling licensees of the responsibility of running a station they no
longer want. 35°
(2) Elimination of the "Top-Ffly" Policy
The Commission's "Top-Fifty" Policy required those seeking to acquire
a fourth TV station (either UHF or VHF) or third VHF station in the top
fifty television markets to make a compelling public interest showing that
the benefits of such ownership would "overcome the detriment with re-
344. Amendment of the Commission's Rule Regarding Applications for Voluntary As-
signments or Transfers of Control, 47 Fed. Reg. 55,924 (Dec. 14, 1982) (to be codified at 47
C.F.R. pt. 0, 73).
345. Id at 55,927. Licenses obtained as a result of a comparative hearing must be held
for at least one year before they can be sold for a profit. The Commission concluded that
this restriction was necessary to maintain the integrity of its hearing processes.
346. 47 Fed. Reg. at 55,930.
347. The decision also acknowledges that "artificial mechanisms" such as the trafficking
rule may, by disturbing marketplace forces, overinflate station prices. Id at 55,927.
348. Fowler & Brenner, supra note 199, at 245.




spect to the policy of diversifying the sources of mass media communica-
tions to the public." '' In abolishing this policy, the Commission relied
largely upon changes in the video marketplace that had lessened concen-
tration levels.352
The Commission noted that the creation of new, competitive video out-
lets such as LPTV, and the existence of other multiple ownership rules,
tend to foster diversity of program voices on the local and national
levels.3 53 Based upon an analysis of economic concentration in the top-
fifty markets since 1968, the Commission found no trend toward increasing
concentration.354 Indeed, the Commission determined that "the top fifty
markets are the very markets with the greatest number of competing
voices, so that each owner's expected share of that potential audience will
be much less."3 5
(3) Relaxation of the Cable-Telephone Cross-Ownership Rule
The Commission has carved out a limited exemption from the ban on
cable-telephone cross-ownership, for rural areas.356 In the future, tele-
phone companies may operate cable television systems in rural areas, de-
fined as places with less than 2,500 inhabitants, a definition encompassing
roughly 26.3% of the United States population.357 Waivers of the rule
would still be required where a competing cable system is under construc-
tion or in existence.
In authorizing this limited entry by telephone companies, the Commis-
sion noted that competition would facilitate service to underserved rural
areas. This benefit, in the FCC's view, outweighed the need to protect the
cable television service from competition since that service had become
increasingly viable.358
B. Antitrust Law as a Remedy for Market Failure
The FCC's increasing reliance on marketplace forces has been accompa-
nied by an emphasis on antitrust law.359 Antitrust law is perceived as a
351. Multiple Ownership of TV Broadcast Stations, 22 F.C.C.2d 696, 700 (1968).
352. Top 50 Ownership Policy, 75 F.C.C.2d 585, 590 (1979).
353. Id at 592-93.
354. Id at 593-96.
355. Id at 595.
356. Telephone Co. CATV Cross-Ownership, 88 F.C.C.2d 564 (1981).
357. ld at 574-75.
358. Id at 572.
359. See Botein, New Communications Technology The Emerging Antitrust Agency, 4
CoMM./ENT. L.J. 685, 686 (1981).
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means of ensuring that natural market forces remain unrestricted, and as a
source of guidance for the Commission's public interest determinations.
I. Recent Antitrust Settlements
a. AT&T-Department of Justice Consent Decree
On August 24, 1982, the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia approved a settlement agreement in the Department of Justice's
antitrust suit against AT&T and Western Electric Company, Inc.36° In
exchange for divestiture of the twenty-two Bell Operating Companies
which provide local telephone services, AT&T was allowed to retain its
manufacturing and research subsidiaries (Western Electric and Bell Labo-
ratories) and to engage in certain business activities prohibited by the 1956
Consent Decree.
The 1956 Consent Decree restricted AT&T to the provision of regulated
common carrier services. The settlement agreement, as originally pro-
posed by AT&T and Justice, would have eliminated any line-of-business
restraints on AT&T following divestiture of its operating companies. In
approving the settlement, however, Judge Harold Greene imposed restric-
tions on AT&T with respect to provision of "electronic publishing ser-
vices" transmitted over facilities owned by AT&T.
Based upon First Amendment concerns, the nascent nature of the indus-
try, and AT&T's ability to delay time-sensitive transmissions of its compet-
itors, Greene required a modification to the decree that bars AT&T from
providing "electronic publishing over its own transmission facilities" for a
seven year period. Judge Greene defined electronic publishing as "the
provision of any information which AT&T or its affiliates has, or has
caused to be, originated, authorized, compiled, collected, or edited, or in
which it has a direct or indirect financial or proprietary interest, and which
is disseminated to an unaffiliated person through some electronic
means."
361
The modifications, however, would not preclude AT&T from offering
"electronic directory services that list general product and business catego-
ries, the service or product providers under these categories, and their
names, telephone numbers, and addresses; or from providing the time,
weather, and such other audio services as are being offered as of the date
of the entry of the decree to the geographic areas of the country receiving
those services as of that date.
362
360. United States v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C.
1982), a1fd 103 S. Ct. 1240 (1983).
361. Id at 225.
362. Id In 1989, AT&T could petition the court for permission to enter the electronic
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b. National Association of Broadcasters-Department of Justice
Consent Decree
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia held on
March 3, 1982, that the commercial advertising restrictions in the Televi-
sion Code of the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) violate anti-
trust laws by artificially enhancing the demand for commercial time.3 63
An underlying issue in the litigation was the appropriate role to be played
by broadcast industry self-regulation, government regulation and the free
play of market forces.
The Justice Department had argued that the competition resulting from
elimination of the Code provisions would operate to prevent excessive
commercialization, as would the "emergence of new technologies (e.g.,
satellites) and the proliferation of new entertainment sources (e.g., cable,
videotape). ' 364 The court did not speculate on the accuracy of this predic-
tion, but said that the commercial restrictions were inconsistent with the
basic Sherman Act policy favoring "free and fair competition."
365
Judge Greene approved a proposed consent decree between the NAB
and Justice on November 23, 1982.3s In exchange for the government
promising not to object to the dismissal of Judge Greene's March 3, 1982
order, the NAB agreed to stop disseminating or enforcing any rule gov-
erning the quantity, placement or format of non-program material.
2. Economic Models for Measuring Competition in the Marketplace
Commencing with the Network Inquiry Special Staff Report, the Com-
mission has shown a renewed interest in antitrust law models as a basis for
deregulation. In its 1980 final report, the Special Staff employed tools of
antitrust policy and economic analysis in order to distinguish "patterns of
ownership integration that threaten competition and diversity from those
that will not harm these vital interests but, instead, may encourage a more
efficient system of television networking.367
In seeking to identify harmful conduct, the staff developed a theoretical
framework whereby ownership questions were classified on a structural
publishing market and unless another party could show that competitive conditions clearly
require maintenance of the ban, the prohibition would be lifted. Id
363. United States v. National Assoc. of Broadcasters, 536 F. Supp. 149 (D.D.C. 1982).
The Code restricted the number of products an advertiser could promote in a commercial
lasting over 60 seconds.
364. Id at 166-67.
365. Id at 167.
366. Memorandum, United States v. National Assoc. of Broadcasters, Civil Action No.
79-1549 (D.D.C. 1982).
367. NETWORK INQUIRY, supra note 183, at 165.
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basis as horizontal, vertical or conglomerate, and recommended appropri-
ate guidelines.36 An illustrative example is the staff's analysis of the net-
work-cable cross-ownership rule, which, it concluded, is directed against
conglomerate activity. Rather than maintain a wholesale prohibition of
these ownership patterns, the report stated:
[Tjhe Commission should. . . employ rigorous horizontal analy-
sis to identify a threshold of ownership concentration among the
nation's cable systems below which the dangers of market power
and cable network foreclosure are slight and then permit any firm
to acquire cable franchises as long as its acquisitions do not push
the firm's cable system aggregate ownership above that
threshold.369
After examining the relevant marketplace, the staff concluded that the ex-
isting rule operates to restrain competition and diversity in the cable mar-
ket and prevents economies of scale "that could enhance efficiency and
lower the price and increase the quality of cable service to advertisers and
viewers."
370
The Commission has increasingly turned to antitrust law and economic
models in an effort to distinguish anticompetitive behavior. In the net-
work-cable cross-ownership proceeding, for example, Commissioner Daw-
son called for a definition of the relevant market and for a standardized
measure of concentration in that marketplace. In her view, a means of
determining the level at which concentration becomes detrimental to the
public interest is "essential to insure a procompetitive transition to a de-
regulatory marketplace.
'372
The Office of Plans and Policy prepared a staff report to address these
concerns. The report, entitled Measurement of Concentration in Home
Video Markets,373 examines techniques for measuring concentration and
market definition issues and recommends procedures the Commission
could follow to develop a "media concentration index" as part of a pro-
gram for monitoring ownership. Although the staff report recommends an
expansive definition of product and geographic markets, including video-
discs and cassettes as well as the audio and print media, it makes sample
calculations based on four "core" media in a video delivery market-
368. Id at 111-23, 111-157-63.
369. Id at 111-163.
370. Id. A similar economic analysis is employed in STAFF REPORT, OFFICE OF PLANS
AND POLICY, FCC POLICY ON CABLE OWNERSHIP (Nov. 1981).
371. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (CT Docket No. 82-434), 47 Fed. Reg. 39,212
(Sept. 7, 1982) (separate statement of Commissioner Mimi Weyforth Dawson).
372. Id
373. OPP REPORT, supra note 190.
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broadcast television, STV, MDS, and cable.374
The report suggests that the Commission's ownership policy goals (eco-
nomic competition and diversity) are best viewed as processes to be en-
couraged rather than results to be mandated. Thus, if consumers have
available a reasonably wide range of suppliers of goods, services and ideas
from which to choose, ownership regulation is unnecessary and also is un-
wise in that it prevents efficient organizational arrangements. OPP con-
cluded that local ownership rules may be needed to keep local markets
reasonably competitive, but that no rigid national ownership rules are ap-
propriate.3 " When local markets are reasonably competitive, the Com-
mission's goals are realized within them. When local markets are not
competitive, the Commission should examine the effect of mergers and ac-
quisitions on concentration. Sample calculations in the report, based on
the "worst case" assumption that no local markets are competitive, suggest
that national concentration is quite low. The staff report recommends that
if the Commission chooses to employ a concentration index, such as the
Herfindahl-Hirschman index used by the Department of Justice, it should
be used only as a monitoring tool that might trigger detailed analysis of
some mergers or acquisitions.37 6
Another recent proceeding, to revise the ownership attribution require-
ments, illustrates the Commission's increasing reliance upon, and sensitiv-
ity to, principles of antitrust law in its public interest determinations. In
seeking to redefine the interests cognizable under the multiple ownership
rules, the Commission indicated that it would be guided by the antitrust
laws and stated that any rule adopted must "advance the objectives of the
antitrust component of the public interest standard embodied in the Com-
munications Act."37 The FCC also said that the rule should be tailored to
avoid inhibition of "the most efficient combination of video distribution
resources by erecting ownership standards which proscribe combinations
that would not be suspect under the Justice Department's recently revised
antitrust and merger guidelines. 378
IV. MARKETPLACE UNREGULATION: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE 1980's
Consistent with the trends described above, the Commission's reliance
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policy objectives can be expected to spur further deregulation during the
rest of the decade. This section suggests the direction that "marketplace
unregulation" is likely to take if carried to its logical conclusions, within
the parameters of the existing statutory structure.
A. Entry Policies
The Commission's entry policies have traditionally been directed toward
restricting the uses and users of spectrum. Over the next decade, the
agency is likely to erode this traditional approach by permitting use of the
spectrum for multiple services. The Commission's elimination of service
"pigeonholes," based upon spectrum allocation, is evident in the FM sub-
carrier and teletext proceedings, which permit broadcasters to transmit
nonbroadcast materials and to operate as common carrier or private radio
services. Other examples are the decisions permitting the sharing of idle
ITFS and broadcast auxiliary spectrum. A foreshadowing of future trends
in spectrum allocation appears in the Commission's recent proposal to per-
mit "interservice" sharing of broadcast frequencies by private fixed service
users, common carriers and cable systems.379 The Commission, in effect,
has proposed to allocate according to the technical characteristics and elec-
tromagnetic compatibility of the services, rather than the type of regula-
tory entity involved.
Application of a marketplace approach in this area could, by opening up
spectrum to new types of uses and classes of users, potentially bring an end
to policies designed to preserve existing services. For example, regulation
of cable and other pay services has been based largely on a concern that
conventional free television service could be jeopardized by unfettered
competition. In authorizing DBS, and deregulating cable and STV, the
Commission concluded that its actions would not threaten the existence of
conventional broadcasting. It skirted the politically charged issue, how-
ever, of whether the public interest continues to demand rules designed to
preserve conventional broadcasting.
This approach could have ramifications for UHF television service. In
the VHF drop-in proceeding, for example,3"' the Commission proposed to
disregard the effect of such allocations upon vacant UHF channels since
UHF-TV has "achieved a reasonable degree of viability" and "it should be
left to the marketplace to determine whether new service comes from VHF
or UHF."' 'I By endangering the growth of UHF television, a marketplace
379. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Gen. Docket No. 82-334), 48 Fed. Reg. 6730 (Feb.
15, 1983).
380. Table of TV Channel Allotments, 83 F.C.C.2d 52 (1980).
381. Id at 77 (emphasis in original).
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approach could disrupt an important avenue of local television service.
Another potential development would be the adoption of measures
designed to facilitate entry by avoiding licensing delays. A lottery system,
for example, is one way in which the delays and expense of a comparative
hearing could be eliminated, thereby hastening new services to the public.
The Commission has adopted rules implementing a random selection sys-
tem for low power television and translator stations, certain private radio
services, and the public mobile common carrier radio service.382 Under
section 309(i) of the Communications Act,383 the Commission could estab-
lish a lottery to award initial licenses or construction permits involving any
use of the electromagnetic spectrum.384
The Commission also appears to be moving towards a free market ap-
proach to entry whereby users of spectrum vie with each other to deter-
mine its best use. This approach is predicated on the view that decisions
rooted in perceptions of market value would achieve a more economically
efficient use of frequency spectrum.38 5 Natural economic forces would
perform the Commission's current allocation and interference control
functions, and there would be an end to regulatory or service distinctions.
Licensees could use their channels for whatever purpose they want consis-
tent with their frequency rights and international and United States
laws.
386
Auctioning would be one possible method of allocating spectrum under
a free market approach. By selling or leasing spectrum to the highest bid-
der, auctions would substitute decisions of the market for those of a regu-
latory agency, with the market determining the price for a given channel
and its highest use.387 The auctioning approach has been proposed for
satellite orbital positions, satellite transponder slots and for MDS.
Another approach would impose fees for the use of spectrum, reflecting
its value. The difficulty with this approach is setting a "fair market value"
for spectrum. Such fees would have to duplicate the results of a competi-
tive market, and would need to take into account all relevant information
(i.e., class of license, location, bandwidth, and area of coverage). 38 8
382. Report and Order (Gen. Docket No. 81-768), 53 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1401 (1983).
383. 47 U.S.C. § 309(i) (Supp. V 1981).
384. See CONFERENCE REP. No. 765, 97TH CONG., 2D SEsS. 37 (1982) for a discussion of
the public interest parameters which limit the Commission's discretion to use a lottery
system.
385. See generally D. WEBBINK, FREQUENCY SPECTRUM DEREGULATION ALTERNA-
TIVES 7 (Office of Plans and Policy, Sept. 1982).
386. Id at 25.
387. Id See also Barron, There's No Such Thing as a Free Airwave; A Proposal to Insti-
te a Market Allocation Scheme for Electromagnetic Frequencies, 9 J. OF LEG. 205 (1982).
388. See Siddall, Legal Analysis of Radio Spectrum Use Charges, Congressional Re-
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B. Ownership Policies
The Commission's ownership rules have been directed primarily toward
fostering diversity in programming through diversification of owner-
ship.389 The Commission has also sought to increase competition, in order
to prevent a concentration of control over sources of news and opinion. To
achieve these objectives the Commission has enacted "concentration of
control" rules, which generally place aggregate limits on ownership of
broadcast properties,3 ° and "duopoly" rules, which limit the common
ownership of communications outlets serving the same area. 91 In addi-
tion, it has fostered diversity through its comparative licensing policies
which give a preference to entities without other media interests.392
There has been increasing recognition that ownership restrictions may
be anachronistic at a time when the telecommunications marketplace is
characterized by an abundance of outlets. In 1980, the Network Inquiry
Special Staff concluded:
The Commission's rules respecting the number of communica-
tions outlets one firm may own within a single local market and,
even more especially, its rules limiting the number of television
stations one firm may own throughout the nation are arbitrary
and capricious. They frequently impose uniform numerical limi-
tations that have no apparent relationship to the distinct condi-
tions of competition and diversity among the several services,
and in the many markets, affected by these rules. Further, these
rules impose disparate limits on the ownership of facilities which
provide substantially similar services. The rules, without appar-
ent justification, permit certain firms to acquire substantially
more powerful and profitable facilities while owners of other, less
search Service, Library of Congress (Apr. 20, 1979) (concludes that there is no legally sure
method to collect fees for the use of spectrum which guarantees returns that exceed the cost
of administering the fee system).
389. See Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM & TV Broadcast Stations, 12 F.C.C.2d
912 (1968). See also FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
See generally Howard, Multiple Broadcast Ownershp: Regulatory History, 27 FED. COMM.
L.J. 1 (1974).
390. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.35(b), 73.240(a) (1982).
391. 47 C.F.R. § 73.636(a)(2) (1982).
392. The FCC, for example, prohibits ownership of more than seven AM or FM radio
stations, or more than seven television stations (of which no more than five may be in the
VHF band). 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.35, 73.240, 73.636 (1982). The Commission forbids ownership
of three broadcast stations where any two are within 100 miles of the third and there is a
primary contour overlap. 47 C.F.R. § 73.636(a)(2) (1982). The Commission prohibits own-
ership of two stations in the same broadcast service located in the same or overlapping areas;
of a VHF TV station and a radio station in the same market; or of a broadcast station and a




powerful, outlets are constrained in their ability to expand. As
currently constructed, these rules often may serve only to impair
the realization of efficiencies in the use of television outlets. Cer-
tainly, they should not serve as a model for Commission regula-
tion of outlets employing new technologies.393
Consistent with the Network Inquiry, the Commission has decided
against imposing any limits on ownership or control of DBS during the
experimental phase of its operation, 3 declined to adopt limits on the
number of cable systems or subscribers that could be controlled by a single
entity,395 and rejected ownership restrictions for LPTV stations.396 As to
the new technologies, the Commission concluded that experienced broad-
casters could make significant contributions to services of uncertain viabil-
ity. In effect, however, the Commission has accomplished an "end run"
around existing multiple ownership rules. It makes little sense to perpetu-
ate those rules when a broadcaster may own LPTV stations and MDS sys-
tems in its market capable of delivering a video product that is virtually
indistinguishable from the consumer's standpoint.
The Commission has also proposed to eliminate the current restrictions
on ownership of cable systems by the conventional broadcast networks.39 7
Its proposal reflects a recognition that, given the increasing numbers of
video outlets and the deconcentrated nature of the cable marketplace, mar-
ket dominance by any one firm is unlikely. Moreover, the proposed rule
deletion acknowledges that ownership restrictions may inhibit certain effi-
ciencies of operation which benefit consumers.398
In addition, the stage has been set for a reexamination of the "7-7-7"
rule. In Chairman Fowler's view, those restrictions, which limit a single
owner to seven AM, seven FM, and seven TV outlets, make
little sense when measuring impact if you compare owning seven
stations in the top ten markets with owning seven in markets 125
to 150. . . I prefer a view that looks at a company's overall im-
pact in a market, not just at those media that happen to use radio
393. NETWORK INQUIRY, supra note 183, at 17.
394. Direct Broadcast Satellites, 90 F.C.C.2d 676, 711-13 (1982).
395. Report and Order (Docket No. 18891), 47 Fed. Reg. 39,212 (Sept. 7, 1982).
396. Low Power Television, 51 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 476, 513-17 (1982). The Commis-
sion has also declined to place ownership restrictions on multichannel MDS systems. See
FCC News Release, Rep. No. 17,521 (May 27, 1983).
397. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Docket No. 20521), 48 Fed. Reg. 10,082 (Mar. 10,
1982).
398. Id See also Levy & Stetzer, Measurement of Concentration in Home Video Mar-
kets (Dec. 23, 1982); STAFF REPORT, OFFICE OF PLANS & POLICY, FCC POLICY ON CABLE
OWNERSHIP (Nov. 1981). Also pending before the Commission is a petition for rulemaking,
ified by the United States Independent Telephone Association, to repeal the cable-telephone
cross-ownership prohibition. See BROADCASTING, June 27, 1983, at 7.
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frequencies to distribute programming.399
C. Content Regulation
The telecommunications revolution spawned by cable and other tech-
nologies has spurred a reexamination of the merits of content regulation of
programming carried by broadcast stations. Content regulation in the
broadcast area has traditionally focused upon nonentertainment and pub-
lic affairs programming, and upon the licensee's responsiveness to commu-
nity needs and interests. Under a marketplace approach, market forces,
not government prescriptions, determine the appropriate mix of
programming.
The Commission's radio deregulation proceeding, recently affirmed by
the court, reflects a movement away from government mandated program-
ming toward a reliance upon consumer demand and licensee discretion. A
similar approach was applied to STV and LPTV stations, which are ex-
empted from the Commission's ascertainment and nonentertainment pro-
gramming requirements. The next logical step would be the deregulation
of television."
There have also been efforts to repeal portions of the Communications
Act which are perceived as interfering with the first amendment rights of
broadcasters to make editorial judgments." 1 These statutory provisions
include sections 312 and 315, which impose reasonable access obligations
and equal opportunities requirements upon broadcasters in their dealings
with political candidates. Also targeted by the Commission are those sec-
tions prohibiting the broadcast of obscenity and lottery information. In
calling for first amendment parity for the electronic media by eliminating
the fairness doctrine, which requires licensees to present contrasting view-
points on controversial issues of public importance," 2 the Commission
stated:
The "Fairness Doctrine" is a significant government intrusion on
the First Amendment rights of broadcasters. The traditional
spectrum scarcity argument which has provided the basis of the
Doctrine has become increasingly less valid as new technologies
proliferate and the number of broadcast facilities increases, par-
399. The Public's Interest, Remarks of Mark S. Fowler, Chairman, FCC, Before the In-
ternational Radio Television Society, New York City, N.Y., Sept. 23, 1981, reprinted in 4
COMMUNICATIONS AND THE LAW 51, 56 (1982).
400. See Mayer, Fowler Hoping Deregulation of TV Starts Soon, Wash. Post, Oct. 30,
1982 at D9, col. 4.
401. See, e.g., H.R. 2382, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (introduced by Reps. Tauzin &
Tauke).
402. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1976). See also Fairness Doctrine, 40 F.C.C. 598 (1964).
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ticularly as compared with the print media. Consequently, there
is no longer any justification for imposing these obligations on
broadcasters when it would be unconstitutional to do so on the
print media." 3
Consistent with this view, Senator Robert Packwood has proposed statu-
tory reform for electronic communication to bring its first amendment
rights more in line with those accorded print and speech
communication.'
D. Technical Standards
The Commission, as indicated, has allowed a "marketplace" solution to
the choice of technical standards with respect to AM stereo, teletext, and
DBS. Consistent with its approach to these new technologies, the Com-
mission has initiated an inquiry to examine existing technical regulations
and to eliminate those which no longer serve any purpose.4° The scope of
the inquiry is "rules of an engineering/technical nature which limit or
otherwise govern the public's use of the frequency spectrum, and the elec-
trical characteristics of radio and other electronic equipment and systems
under the Commission's jurisdiction."'
This broad-based inquiry raises fundamental questions about the Com-
mission's role in technical standardization. It suggests that marketplace
forces may in some instances be substituted for technical regulations, effec-
tively ending the Commission's "traffic cop" function. This technical de-
regulation could potentially eliminate transmission performance
standards, allow any type of innovative transmission system to begin
broadcasting without prior Commission approval and allow for existence
of multiple, incompatible transmission systems.
V. EPILOGUE: THE UNTESTED ASSUMPTIONS OF MARKETPLACE
UNREGULATION
As this article went to press, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit observed that the "rising tide of deregula-
403. FCC Sets First Proposal for Amending Communications Act, FCC Report No. 5068
(Sept. 17, 1981), at 34.
404. Senator Packwood had supported a constitutional amendment to guarantee broad-
casters full first amendment protection, but dropped the proposal because of the difficulty of
adoption. He now favors legislation to repeal the fairness doctrine and political broadcast-
ing rules. See "ragmatic" Sen. Packwood to Drop First Amendment Push for Broadcasters,
COMMUNICATIONS DAILY, Apr. 12, 1983 at 1-2.
405. Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rulemaking (Gen. Docket No. 83-114), 48 Fed.
Reg. 14,399 (Apr. 4, 1983).
406. Id at 1.
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tion" that was sweeping the country in general and the broadcast industry
in particular has become "a tidal wave," and the Fowler Commission has
become "one of the foremost advocates of across-the-board deregulation
for the entire broadcast industry." 7 This deregulation, as noted, has been
spurred largely by technological developments that have brought about a
more diverse and flexible video marketplace.
Consumers have a rapidly expanding choice of video entertainment and
information services, including MDS, SMATV, cable television, videotex,
videocassettes and videodiscs. Direct-to-the-home satellite television and
LPTV will be available, in the near future, as an additional alternative to
conventional television. More efficient spectrum use, through multiplex-
ing, compression and subcarrier operations, could create even more video
outlets.
These marketplace changes have forced the FCC to alter its traditional
ways of regulating the media. The blurring of distinctions between com-
mon carrier, broadcast, private radio and print services, for example, has
precipitated a more "functional" approach to regulation. Recognizing
that, to the consumer, there is little difference between a movie delivered
by satellite, and one by cable or VCR, the Commission has increasingly
looked to the type of service offered and the manner in which it is of-
fered-rather than the type of regulatory entity involved-in determining
the appropriate regulatory treatment.
In addition, the scarcity rationale, which historically has justified gov-
ernment regulation, has been undercut by the multiplicity of competing
video services now or soon to be available to consumers. Accepting the
thesis that scarcity no longer exists, at least in the video marketplace, the
Fowler Commission has viewed unfettered competition, rather than gov-
ernment regulation, as the best means of serving the public interest. Regu-
lation is believed to be unnecessary and inefficient from the consumer
perspective.
The FCC's General Counsel has predicted that history will record the
contemporary era as one of Promethean and judicious change in the na-
tion's telecommunications laws: "Spearheaded by intellectual develop-
ments that have discredited aged and misbegotten concepts of competition,
the First Amendment, and the public interest, an irreversible erosion has
begun into the colossus of regulatory law and policy assembled over a half
century in Title 47 of the United States Code and its four-volume sister
407. Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. F.C.C., Case No. 81-1032,
slip. op. at 56 (D.C. Cir. May 10, 1983).
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residing in the Code of Federal Regulations." 8 This glowing description
of the benefits of the Commission's reliance on market forces as a substi-
tute for regulation fails to acknowledge that the policy and legal assump-
tions underlying "marketplace unregulation" are still untested. Indeed,
the District of Columbia Circuit recently reminded the Commission in the
radio deregulation case that while the agency may strip away regulatory
accretions, a strict market approach may be contrary to the Communica-
tions Act. 40
9
While the benefits of competition are evident from the increased availa-
bility and diversity of video programming, it remains to be seen whether
competition will be effective to provide needed services absent regulation,
and whether the Fowler Commission's view of the marketplace as a bal-
anced mechanism is accurate. A possible consequence of increased com-
petition could be the eventual replacement of free service with pay
television. Alternatively, some of the new technologies may not survive in
this competitive environment, making the heralded abundance of video
outlets an illusory promise. In addition, the Commission's authorization
of new services could disrupt other publicly beneficial services, or force
difficult choices, as indicated by the controversy between DBS and existing
terrestrial users of the twelve GHz band.
A marketplace approach can entail a certain degree of uncertainty, as
the area of technical standards illustrates.4t° Adoption of AM stereo, for
example, has been indefinitely delayed because of marketplace uncertain-
ties, and the difficulties of reaching a consensus due to antitrust law con-
cerns. It now appears that consumers may not get the opportunity the
FCC has in mind for them, namely, of "voting" with their dollars for the
best system. Similar problems can be expected to delay implementation of
teletext. A question is raised, therefore, as to whether the market can oper-
ate without FCC-selected standards.
Carried to its logical extreme, a marketplace approach could lead to the
withdrawal of regulatory involvement or termination of regulatory pro-
grams designed to fulfill social objectives. One result might be the elimi-
nation of Commission policies requiring broadcasters to air children's and
public affairs programs which would not otherwise be justified by the mar-
ketplace. Other Commission policies designed to implement social objec-
408. Address by Bruce E. Fein, General Counsel, FCC, to the Federal Communications
Bar Association, Jan. 20, 1983, at I (emphasis added).
409. Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, Case No. 81-1032,
slip. op. at 57 (D.C. Cir. May 10, 1983).
410. The Odd Couple, BROADCASTING, Nov. 29, 1982, at 40. See also Technology- Wait-
ingfor the Marketplace, BROADCASTING, Jan. 5, 1983, at 80; Sterling, The FCC and Chang-
ing Technological Standards, J. OF COMM. 137 (Autumn 1982).
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tives, such as equal employment opportunity, could fall by the wayside
under the pure marketplace approach. Also, if the FCC were to embrace
Chairman Fowler's characterization of television as "just another appli-
ance-it's a toaster with pictures,"41 ' it would make little sense for the
Commission to be concerned about the qualifications or character of
licensees.
In sum, the assumptions underlying "marketplace unregulation" are, as
yet, untested, and its ramifications remain to be seen. Moreover, the pub-
lic and the courts may be unwilling to see a marketplace approach carried
to its logical conclusions. Indeed, the recent Court of Appeals' radio de-
regulation decision suggests that Congress-"and not the unrepresentative
bureaucracy and judiciary"-may be the more appropriate source of de-
regulation over the next decade.412
411. See Mayer, FCC Chiefs Fears, Fowler Sees Threat in Regulation, Wash. Post, Feb.
6, 1983, at K6, Col. 4.
412. Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, Case No. 81-1032,
slip. op. at 57 (D.C. Cir. May 10, 1983).
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